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Negotiation-as an alternative or an adjunct to the adversarial proc-
ess-increasingly is touted as the wave of the future. It is argued that
negotiation is a more efficient use of societal resources, because it is
more likely to produce a result that all sides can accept. Moreover, nego-
tiation is said to be more likely to produce creative solutions, because it
forces the parties to focus on cooperation rather than confrontation. This
Article provides an analysis of the use of negotiation in formulating and
implementing environmental and occupational health and safety policy in
the United States, and it attempts to assess the potential of negotiation to:
(a) foster improved environmental and health and safety outcomes, and
(b) stimulate technological change.
II. MODES OF NEGOTIATION
In a broad sense, there are three major instances in which negotia-
tion is used to make or effectuate policy within the federal administrative
system of the United States. First, there is negotiated rulemaking,
whereby negotiation is used to help set regulatory standards. Once a par-
ticular statutory mandate is passed by Congress and signed by the Presi-
dent, it falls to the responsible agency to develop the particularized stan-
dards that will implement that mandate. As long as they act within the
bounds defined by. Congress in their statutory mandates, agencies are
often given considerable latitude in such standard-setting. For the past
twenty years or so, both the United States Environmental Protection
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Agency ("EPA") and the United States Occupational Safety and Health
Administration ("OSHA") have made occasional use of negotiated rule-
making-a process whereby representatives of the various major con-
stituencies expected to be affected by a contemplated regulation attempt
to develop a proposed version of that regulation on which all (or most) of
them can agree-to help set regulatory standards. As discussed below,
Congress has generally encouraged use of this procedure.
Second, negotiated implementation is used to determine how regu-
latory standards, once set, are to be applied to a particular firm or other
member of the regulated community. Under the law, such negotiation is
appropriate only to the extent that it is consistent with the policy mandate
set by Congress. For example, when the statute specifies that a particular
standard is to be applied uniformly across the regulated industry by a
given date, no such negotiation is proper. Under United States environ-
mental statutes, negotiated implementation often occurs when a permit is
being issued or revised, as is the case with EPA's recent Project XL ini-
tiative.' Such negotiation also occurs when the regulated firm seeks a
waiver or variance from the regulatory standard at issue. Of particular
interest here are the innovation waivers that have been made available by
Congress in certain environmental statutes. When EPA grants such a
waiver, the firm is given additional time to comply with the standard so
that it may perfect a promising innovative compliance technology. Simi-
larly, the Occupational Safety and Health Act ("OSHAct") 2 authorizes
OSHA to grant waivers to selected firms that need additional time to per-
fect new and improved technologies to protect worker health or safety.
Third, negotiated compliance is used to determine the terms by
which regulatory standards will be enforced against a particular firm or
other regulated entity that is out of compliance with those standards. By
its nature, of course, almost all enforcement involves some amount of
negotiation between the enforcing agency (or, in the case of citizen en-
forcement suits, the enforcing citizen) and the alleged violator. Of inter-
est here are those compliance negotiations that result in: (a) compliance
through the use of innovative technology, and/or (b) environmental or
public health or safety gains beyond compliance. Within the past decade,
EPA has pioneered the use of what it terms "Supplemental Environmental
Projects"3 in an attempt to meet these goals within the compliance con-
text.
Within the current administration, there is also what might be
classified as a fourth type of policy-relevant negotiation known as regu-
latory reinvention.4 The most prominent example of this is EPA's Com-
mon Sense Initiative,5 wherein the agency has assembled groups of inter-
ested parties to focus on regulatory issues concerning a particular indus-
try sector (e.g., automobile manufacturing), with the goal of developing
"cleaner, cheaper, smarter" ways of reducing or preventing pollution.6
III. NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING
Since the mid-1970s, many commentators in the United States have
advocated the use of negotiated rulemaking as a more efficient, sensible
alternative to the traditional "notice and comment" procedure typically
followed by federal agencies in the development of regulations.7 Occa-
sionally in the 1970s, and more often in the 1980s, EPA, OSHA, and
other federal agencies used the negotiation process as an aid to the de-
velopment of certain regulations. Often, such negotiations were held un-
der the provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act ("FACA"), a
1972 statute governing the creation and operation of advisory committees
convened to assist agency decisionmaking. 8 In 1990, Congress formally
endorsed negotiated rulemaking with the passage of the federal Negoti-
ated Rulemaking Act. 9 The Clinton Administration has been a strong
supporter of its use.' °
A. Negotiated Rulemaking Within the U.S. Administrative System
The Negotiated Rulemaking Act specifies a set of procedures to be
followed by an agency wishing to use negotiated rulemaking, although
the Act cautions that these procedures "should [not] be construed as an
5. See infra notes 269-297 and accompanying text.
6. NAT'L ACADEMY OF PUB. ADMIN., SETTING PRIORITIES, GETTING RESULTS: A NEW
DIRECTION FOR THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 97 (1995).
7. See, e.g., J. Dunlop, The Limits of Legal Compulsion, O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) 884,
886 (Nov. 12, 1975); LAWRENCE G. BACOW, BARGAINING FOR JOB SAFETY AND HEALTH
(1980); Phillip J. Harter, Negotiating Rules: A Cure for the Malaise, 71 GEO. L.J. 1 (1982);
Lawrence Susskind & Gerard McMahon, The Theory and Practice of Negotiated Rule-
making, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 133 (1985).
8. See 5 U.S.C. App. 2 §§ 1-15 (1994). FACA requires, inter alia, that: (1) with
certain exceptions, all groups convened by a federal agency to provide advice on agency
decisionmaking be treated as "advisory committees" under FACA, id. § 3(2) (1994);
(2) the membership of advisory committees be "fairly balanced in terms of the points of
view represented and the functions to be performed," id. § 5(b)(2), 5(c); (3) the meetings
of advisory committees be open to the public, see id. § 10(a)(1); and (4) the records of
advisory committee deliberations be open to the public, see id. § 10(b).
9. 5 U.S.C. §§ 561-570 (1994). Congress permanently reauthorized the 1990 Act in
the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-320, 110 Stat. 3870,
3873.
10. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. § 638 (1993). This order directed
each agency "to explore, and where appropriate, use consensual mechanisms for develop-
ing regulations, including negotiated rulemaking." Id.
1. See infra Part IV.A.2.
2. Occupational Safety & Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1994).
3. See infra Part V.A.
4. See infra Part VI.
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attempt to limit innovation and experimentation with the negotiated
rulemaking process . ... "' Under the Act, an agency may, but is not re-
quired to, use negotiated rulemaking to develop a proposed rule when-
ever the agency determines that it would be "in the public interest" to do
so. 2 If the agency desires to use negotiated rulemaking, it must first
identify the various interests that would be significantly affected by a
proposed rule and determine whether those interests could be represented
adequately by a group of persons brought together to serve as a negoti-
ated rulemaking committee. If so, the agency may then establish such a
committee, which is treated as an advisory committee under FACA.1'3 The
negotiated rulemaking committee is to be made up of persons represent-
ing the various affected interests, as well as at least one member of the
agency, who is to serve on the committee "with the same rights and re-
sponsibilities as other members of the committee."'4 The committee's
goal is to determine whether its members can reach a "consensus" (which
may be defined by the committee as something less than unanimity) on
the wording of a draft rule.'5
If the committee reaches consensus, the draft rule is published for
public notice and comment, as is any other proposed rule. The agency
retains authority over the wording of any proposed or final rule, and the
agency is empowered to modify the rule drafted by the committee if it
believes the draft rule is inconsistent with the applicable congressional
mandate. Moreover, a rule drafted through negotiated rulemaking is not
to be "accorded any greater deference by a court than a rule which is a
product of other rulemaking procedures."' 6
B. The Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking as a Means of Saving
Time and Limiting Judicial Challenge
Those who advocate negotiated rulemaking, including Congress,
tend to identify two primary benefits that are expected to flow from its
use: (a) reduced rulemaking time, and (b) decreased litigation over the
final rule. 17 Presumably, face-to-face meetings among the interested par-
11. 5 U.S.C. § 561 (1994).
12. Id. § 563(a).
13. See id. § 562(7). Even without the Negotiated Rulemaking Act, any negotiated
rulemaking committee convened by an agency would presumably be treated as an advisory
committee under FACA, and thus would be required to have "balanced" representation. 5
U.S.C. App. 2 § 5(b)(2)(c) (1994). See also supra note 8. For a discussion of FACA's fair
balance requirement, see Nicholas A. Ashford, Advisory Committees in OSHA and EPA:
Their Use in Regulatory Decisionmaking, 9 ScI. TECH. & HUM. VALUES 72, 76-77 (1984).
14. Id. § 566(b).
15. See id. §§ 566(f), 562(2).
16. Id. § 570.
17. The legislative history of the 1996 reauthorization of the Negotiated Rulemaking
Act reflects almost unanimous support for negotiated rulemaking, and stresses these two
ties will avoid the various bureaucratic quagmires that can delay the
drafting of a rule within an agency, and will produce a proposed rule
more quickly on average. Further, since the interested parties have agreed
on the wording of the proposed rule in advance, the notice and comment
procedure presumably will be less contentious and time-consuming, and
the incentive for anyone to file a judicial challenge to the final rule pre-
sumably will be slight. 8
In practice, however, it is not at all clear that negotiated rulemaking
delivers on either of these promises. Of all the federal agencies in the
United States, EPA has used negotiated rulemaking most often.'9 A recent
study of EPA negotiated rulemakings has concluded that: (a) on average,
the promulgation of EPA rules through negotiated rulemaking took no
less time than did the promulgation of a "control" group of similar EPA
rules through traditional notice and comment rulemaking,20 and (b) fifty
percent of EPA's twelve finalized negotiated rulemakings were the sub-ject of legal challenge, compared with a litigation rate of twenty-six per-
cent for all EPA rules issued during the period from 1987 through 1991.21
To date, then, it has not been established that negotiated rulemaking ac-
tually provides the primary benefits touted by its proponents.22
presumed benefits of negotiated rulemaking. See The Reauthorization of the Negotiated
Rulemaking Act, 1996: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 52-82 (1996), 142 CONG. REC. H12303-
04 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1996).
18. See, e.g., Susskind & McMahon, supra note 7, at 136-37.
19. Cary Coglianese reports that, through 1996, a total of "seventeen federal agen-
cies had initiated at least one negotiated rulemaking process," and that the average number
of negotiated rulemakings initiated by these agencies was four. Cary Coglianese, Assessing
Consensus: The Promise and Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255,
1273 (1997). EPA had initiated the most, and actually had finalized twelve. See id. at
1273-74. When one considers the hundreds of rules issued by EPA through 1996, however,
it is clear that negotiated rulemaking has been used in a very small percentage of EPA
rulemakings. See id. at 1299 n.197 (citing data indicating that EPA issued over 2100 rules
from 1987 through 1991).
20. See id. at 1284-86.
21. See id. at 1298, 1301. If one looks only at all of the more significant EPA rules
issued during this period, the overall litigation rate is 35%. See id. at 1300. Conversely, if
one uses the Office of Management and Budget's data on the total number of EPA rules
issued during this period, the overall litigation rate is only 19%. See id. at 1299. In a less
comprehensive study, Laura Langbein and Cornelius Kerwin found a litigation rate of 33%
for "significant" EPA rules promulgated through the conventional rulemaking process, as
compared to a litigation rate of 29% for EPA rules formulated through negotiated rule-
making. See Laura Langbein & Cornelius Kerwin, Regulatory Negotiation Versus Conven-
tional Rulemaking: Claims, Counter-claims, and Empirical Evidence 19-20 (Nov. 20,
1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review).
22. Interviews conducted by Cornelius Kerwin and Laura Langbein with partici-
pants in negotiated rulemakings at EPA have found general satisfaction with the procedure
and the results. However, "[i]n terms of satisfaction with the process and their experience
with it, certain classes of participants, notably environmental interests, gave lower ratings
than did the others. Their ratings were positive, but marginally so." Cornelius Kerwin &
Laura Langbein, An Evaluation of Negotiated Rulemaking at the Environmental Protection
Agency Phase I: Report for the Administrative Conference of the U.S. 47 (September
1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review).
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C. The Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking as a Means of Securing a
"Better" Rule
Despite an apparent failure to deliver its oft-cited benefits, negoti-
ated rulemaking may offer other advantages. Significantly, because ne-
gotiated rulemaking facilitates face-to-face discussions among rulemak-
ing "adversaries" that might not otherwise occur, there is the potential
that creative solutions to difficult issues may be found as differences are
understood and addressed, and that substantively better rules may
emerge. Such a result might come, for example, through the
identification of opportunities for innovative technological responses
within the regulated community.
As an initial attempt to determine whether this potential is being re-
alized, this Article examines three negotiated rulemakings used by EPA
to set emission standards under the Clean Air Act ("CAA"),2 3 and four
instances in which negotiation was used in an attempt to develop an
OSHAct standard governing occupational exposure to toxic chemicals.
In addition to the limitations imposed by the small number of ex-
amples examined, the problem with an analysis of this nature is that any
attempt to identify a "better" result is a qualitative exercise: depending
on the context, it can mean quite different things to different people. For
the purposes of this Article, the quality of the final rule produced by ne-
gotiated rulemaking is evaluated according to whether it produced a rule
that was more protective of environmental or occupational health than
might have been expected had negotiated rulemaking not been used.
Further, the Article gives particular attention to the extent to which op-
portunities to promote technological change were seized upon by the ne-
gotiating committee.
1. Negotiated Rulemaking and Clean Air Act Emission Standards
Of the twelve negotiated rulemakings completed by EPA through
1996, this Article focuses on three that resulted in the promulgation of air
emission standards under the CAA: (a) the setting of new source per-
formance standards for the woodstove industry, (b) the setting of hazard-
ous air pollutant standards for coke oven emissions, and (c) the setting of
hazardous air pollutant standards for the wood furniture coatings indus-
try. These three are used because they share a common set of features: a
full committee remained with the negotiations to the end; 24 the rule ne-
23. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7767 (1994 & Supp. 1996).
24. This distinguishes this group from the negotiations over EPA's worker protec-
tion standards for agricultural pesticides, where the farmworkers left the negotiating table
early on and the rule was negotiated without their participation. See Worker Protection
Standard, 57 Fed. Reg. 38,102 (1992) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 156, 170).
gotiated was the rule eventually proposed by the agency; 25 and the rule
set an air emission standard designed to protect the environment and/or
public health.2 6
a. The Woodstoves Rule
One of EPA's early forays into negotiated rulemaking was the de-
velopment of a national New Source Performance Standard ("NSPS") for
"residential wood combustion units" (woodstoves). EPA came to regulate
woodstoves as a result of lawsuits brought against the agency by the
Natural Resources Defense Council ("NRDC") and the State of New
York. 27 These suits sought to force EPA to regulate polycyclic organic
matter ("POM") as a hazardous air pollutant under section 112 of the
CAA. 28 As part of its settlement of the POM litigation, EPA agreed to
explore the possibility of regulating woodstoves, one of the primary con-
tributors of POM,2 9 as "stationary sources" of air pollution under section
25. This distinguishes this group from the negotiations over oxygenated and refor-
mulated fuels under the CAA, where EPA chose to promulgate a rule different from the
one negotiated by the negotiated rulemaking committee. See Regulation of Fuels and Fuel
Additives: Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 59 Fed. Reg. 7716
(1994) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 80).
26. Not only does this provide something of a common basis for comparison among
the three negotiations, but it leads to a more straightforward analysis of the level of envi-
ronmental and health protection delivered by the final rule than would an analysis of, for
example, EPA's negotiated information collection rule for disinfectant byproducts in
drinking water, see National Primary Drinking Water Regulations: Monitoring Require-
ments for Public Drinking Water Supplies: Cryptosporidium, Giardia, Viruses, Disinfec-
tion Byproducts, Water Treatment Plant Data and Other Information Requirements, 61
Fed. Reg. 24,354 (1996) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 141), or EPA's negotiated rule on non-
conformance penalties for motor vehicle corw: 1iance testing and certification, see Federal
Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, Occupant Crash Protection, 50 Fed. Reg. 35,233 (1985)
(codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571).
27. See Natural Resources Defense Council v. Alm, No. 84-1473 (D.C. Cir. filed
Sept. 18, 1984); New York v. Thomas, No. 84-1472 (D.C. Cir. filed Sept. 18, 1984). The
lawsuits were brought to enforce § 122(a) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7422(a) (1994), which
was added to the Act in 1977. Under this provision EPA was required to evaluate four
designated substances, including "polycyclic organic matter" (POM), and to determine
whether emissions of such material "into the ambient air will cause, or contribute to, air
pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health." Id. If EPA made
an affirmative determination, it was then required under this section to list POM under
§ 7408(a)(1) as a "criteria" air pollutant or under § 7412(b)(1)(A) as a "hazardous air pol-
lutant." Concluding that there was uncertainty about whether POM endangered public
health within the meaning of § 7422, EPA stated that it could not make such a determina-
tion. See Final Decision, Regulation of Polycyclic Organic Matter Under the Clean Air
Act, 49 Fed. Reg. 31,680 (1984) (codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. 1). The lawsuits followed.
28. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (1994). POM contains chemicals that are known or be-
lieved to be carcinogenic. See Negotiated Agreement on Wood Stoves Would Cut Particu-
late Emissions by 70 Percent, 17 Env't. Rep. (BNA) 821 (1986).
29. POM is produced and released into the air by the partial combustion that is typi-
cal of the woodstove burning process. In 1987, EPA stated that "a growing number of areas
[are] experiencing air quality problems because of particulate and polycyclic organic mat-
ter emissions from woodburning devices." EPA Announces Proposed Air Act Limits to Cut
Wood Stove Particulate Emissions, 17 Env't. Rep. (BNA) 1740 (1987).
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111 of the Act.30 Interestingly, such regulation was desired not only by
environmental groups but also by woodstove manufacturers, who hoped
that the promulgation of a national standard by EPA would discourage
states from setting their own (likely differing) standards.3 '
Section 111 of the CAA requires that a NSPS reflect the level of
emission limitation achievable through the application of the "best sys-
tem of emission reduction ... [that] has been adequately demon-
strated."32 To devise such a national emission standard, EPA convened an
advisory committee consisting of representatives from industry, environ-
mental groups, certain states, a consumer group, and the agency itself.33
Agreement on a single national standard was complicated, however,
by the fact that there were two major categories of woodstoves on the
market-those that incorporated catalytic combusters and those that did
not. It was clear that, at least in the short term, the stoves with catalytic
combusters were capable of meeting a lower, more protective emission
standard than those without catalytic combusters. Because catalytic com-
busters require a higher degree of maintenance, however, there was some
question as to whether they would continue to deliver this greater level of
emission reduction over the long term. Rather than resolve this technical
issue, the negotiating committee agreed rather early on to adopt the in-
dustry position on the matter and to propose two standards-one for
stoves with catalytic combusters and the other for those without.34 Thus,
the opportunity to diffuse what may well be a superior emission-
reduction technology throughout the woodstove industry was lost, as was
an opportunity for innovation through the development of new woodstove
technology.
This does not necessarily mean, however, that the woodstove rule
was a "failure" from an environmental and public health perspective. It is
questionable whether section 111 actually empowers EPA to regulate
residential woodstoves as "stationary sources" of air pollution, especially
since the rule governs the manufacturers and retailers who sell the stoves
rather than the individual homeowners who operate them.35 Thus, it could
be argued that the process of negotiated rulemaking-in which the vari-
ous players were able to agree on a rule despite its legal infirmities-re-
sulted in a giant step forward, in that it produced national emission stan-
30. See 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (1994).
31. See generally William Funk, When Smoke Gets in Your Eyes: Regulatory Nego-
tiation and the Public Interest-EPA's Woodstove Standards, 18 ENVTL. L.J. 55, 61-62,
80-81 (1987).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1) (1994).
33. See Intent to Form an Advisory Committee to Negotiate New Source Perform-
ance Standards for Residential Wood Stove Combustion Units, 51 Fed. Reg. 4800 (1986).
34. See Standards of Performance for New Stationary Sources, New Residential
Wood Heaters, 53 Fed. Reg. 5860 (1988) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60); Funk, supra note
31, at 88.
35. See Funk, supra note 31, at 66-74.
dards which otherwise might not have been promulgated, or which might
have been successfully challenged in court.
On the other hand, the CAA was not the only regulatory alternative
available to address the woodstove issue. The Federal Consumer Prod-
ucts Safety Act ("CPSA"), which governs the design and sale of products
"for use in or around" the home or school, clearly does cover woodstoves
sold for residential use and contemplates regulation of both manufactur-
ers and retailers. 36 It is not clear, however, that regulation under the
CPSA would necessarily have produced a stricter emission standard for
stoves without catalytic combusters. The CPSA requires that the benefits
of a consumer products safety standard be justified by its costs,37 and the
members of the non-catalytic stove industry doubtless would have argued
that a stricter standard would have driven them out of the market. Fur-
ther, unlike EPA, the Consumer Product Safety Commission, a chroni-
cally underfunded agency that is often reluctant to take on new issues,38
had no particular incentive to regulate woodstoves.
b. The Coke Oven Emissions Rule
Coke ovens are used to convert coal to coke, which is then used to
produce steel. Air emissions from coke ovens come largely from leaking
oven doors and lids. In 1992, EPA estimated that some 3.5 million
pounds of toxic chemicals, including benzene, phenol, toluene, and
polyaromatic hydrocarbons, were emitted to the air annually from coke
ovens operating in the United States. Based on this estimate, EPA put the
cancer risk to exposed individuals at one in one hundred.39
Many of the materials emitted by coke ovens are subject to regula-
tion as hazardous air pollutants under section 112 of the CAA, and the
1990 amendments to the Act specifically required that section 112 stan-
dards for coke oven emissions be promulgated by December 31, 1992.40
In early 1992, after meeting with representatives of the steel industry,
relevant labor unions, states, and environmental groups "to discuss avail-
36. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2084 (1994).
37. See, e.g., Aqua Slide 'N' Dive Corp. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 569
F.2d 831, 839-40 (5th Cir. 1978) ("[T]he reasonableness of the risk is a function of the
burden a standard would impose on a user of the product .... The Commission does not
have to conduct an elaborate cost-benefit analysis. It does, however, have to shoulder the
burden of examining the relevant factors and producing substantial evidence to support its
conclusion that they weigh in favor of the standard." (citation omitted)).
38. See, e.g., Tom Christoffel & Katherine K. Christoffel, The Consumer Product
Safety Commission's Opposition to Consumer Product Safety: Lessons for Public Health
Advocates, 79 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 336 (1989) (discussing the Commission's relatively
small budget and its reluctance to regulate).
39. See Year-Long Coke Oven Negotiations Yield Pact Between Steel Industry, Envi-
ronmentalists, 23 Env't. Rep. (BNA) 1669 (1992) [hereinafter Year-Long Coke Oven Ne-
gotiations].
40. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(8)(A) (1994).
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able data to be used as the basis of [a section 112 regulation]," EPA con-
vened a negotiated rulemaking committee that drew from all of these
constituencies. 4 After several negotiating sessions, the committee agreed
on a draft rule that was proposed by the agency in December 1992,42 and
was published as a final rule in October 1993.43
In general, section 112 of the CAA as amended in 1990 takes a two-
tiered approach to the regulation of hazardous air pollutants. EPA must
first set technology-based emission standards, on an industry category-
by-industry category basis. These standards must be set with reference to
the application of the maximum achievable control technology
("MACT") that the industry category can afford.44 Eight years later, the
agency is to set a more stringent, health-based standard if further emis-
sion reductions are deemed necessary to provide "an ample margin of
safety to protect public health."4 5 A health-based standard for carcino-
gens must be set if the technology-based standard fails to "reduce life-
time excess cancer risks to the individual most exposed to [the] emis-
sions . . . to less than one in one million."4 6 For coke oven emissions in
particular, however, section 112 offers an alternative whereby a source
may delay compliance with the health-based standard until 2020 if it
meets a different, more stringent technology-based standard in the in-
terim.4 7 The committee followed this framework in drafting its proposed
rule, and steel industry representatives said afterward that, because they
viewed any likely health-based standard as "essentially a shut-down
standard," they expected all plants except those that planned to go out of
business in the near future to choose this "extended compliance" option.4 8
At the conclusion of the negotiated rulemaking process, participants
from environmental groups, labor, industry, and state governments all
expressed satisfaction with the negotiated rule. 49 An EPA representative
41. EPA's description of the negotiated rulemaking committee and its work, and of
the events leading up to the establishment of the committee, is found in the preamble to the
proposed National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Source Categories;
Coke Oven Batteries, 57 Fed. Reg. 57,534, 57,536 (1992) (proposed Dec. 4, 1992)
(codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63) [hereinafter Preamble].
42. See id.
43. See National Emission Standards for Coke Oven Batteries, 58 Fed. Reg. 57,911
(1993) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63(L)).
44. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d) (1994). We use the term "technology-based standard"
to mean an emission limit that is determined by reference to the level of emission reduc-
tion deemed attainable through the application of a particular technology or set of tech-
nologies. It can, but generally does not, actually require the adoption of the particular ref-
erence technology.
45. Id. § 7412(f). The term "health-based standard" is used to mean an emission
limit that is determined by reference to the level of emission reduction deemed necessary
to attain a particular health goal (such as a particular level of risk).
46. Id. § 7412(f)(2)(A).
47. See id. § 7412(i)(8).
48. Coke Oven NESHAP Includes Two Options Based on Year-Long Negotiated
Rule-Making, 23 Env't. Rep. (BNA) 1934 (1992).
49. See Year-Long Coke Oven Negotiations, supra note 39.
stated his belief that the negotiated rule would result in more emission
reductions than would have been obtained through the conventional
rulemaking process, and remarked that the agency had never before
"been able to grapple with the economic and technological issues" ad-
dressed by the rule.50 It is probably more accurate to say, however, that
the rulemaking was made considerably easier because Congress had
taken it upon itself to specify the dates by which, and the minimum
amounts by which, the steel industry would be asked to reduce emis-
sions. Indeed, the chief contribution of negotiation to the rulemaking
process appears to have been to afford the industry the opportunity to
negotiate a standard that actually is less stringent than that which was
mandated by Congress.
For coke oven facilities choosing the "extended compliance" option,
EPA was required to promulgate two sets of technology-based emission
limits by December 31, 1992, to become effective in November 1993 and
January 1998, respectively. 5' Emission limits for coke ovens had tradi-
tionally been expressed in terms of a maximum permissible percentage of
leaking doors, lids, and offtakes, and Congress adopted this approach in
section 112. For the 1993 limits, Congress specified the precise percent-
ages EPA was to require.5 2 For the 1998 limits, Congress directed the
agency to set percentages "reflecting the lowest achievable emission rate"
("LAER"), and also specified a set of percentages representing the least
stringent permissible 1998 standard that EPA could set, and a second set
representing a more stringent default 1998 standard that was to take ef-
fect if the agency failed to promulgate the 1998 limits by December 31,
1992. 53
The negotiated rulemaking committee began with the 1993 limits
specified in the statute, and with the least stringent permissible 1998
50. Id. The EPA representative was William G. Rosenberg, Assistant Administrator
for Air and Radiation. His comments were echoed by EPA Administrator William Reilly.
In an EPA press release, Reilly stated that the negotiated rule "goes beyond the require-
ments of the Clean Air Act," and offered the rule as "another example ... of where EPA
has successfully used cooperative problem-solving to find an environmentally and eco-
nomically sound solution to a complex pollution problem." U.S. EPA Environmental News
Press Release: EPA Announces Agreement on Coke Oven Rules (Oct. 28, 1992) at 1-2.
51. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(8)(C),(i)(8)(B) (1994).
52. See id. § 7412(d)(8)(C).
53. See id. § 7412(i)(8)(B)(i) (least stringent permissible standard), id § 7412(i)(8)(B)(ii)
(default standard). The two are identical except that the default standard has no exclusion for
"emissions during the period after the closing of self-sealing doors." Id. § 7412(i)(8)(B)(ii). The
negotiated rulemaking committee calculated that the presence of this exclusion added
about two percent to the allowable percentage of leaking doors specified in the least strin-
gent permissible standard. See Telephone Interview with Marvin Branscome, Technical
Consultant on Coke Oven Negotiations, Research Triangle Institute, Research Triangle
Park, N.C. (Dec. 15, 1997). In practical terms, then, this means that the default standard
for leaking doors was, as specified in the statute, "three per centum leaking doors (five per
centum leaking doors for six meter batteries)," while the least stringent permissible stan-
dard, after allowance for the two percent exclusion, was five percent leaking doors (seven
percent leaking doors for six meter batteries). Id.
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limits specified in the statute; however, it converted these limits to "sta-
tistically equivalent" limits based on thirty days' average performance in
the rule promulgated by EPA. s4 Thus, while the statute specified a maxi-
mum percentage that was not to be exceeded, the negotiated rule
specified an average percentage that must be achieved over a thirty-day
period. This allows a facility to exceed the percentage specified in the
statute for certain periods, so long as it is sufficiently below that percent-
age for other periods to maintain the required thirty-day average.55
This change was made because the steel industry expressed concern
that a straightforward application of the standards specified by Congress
would necessitate the closure of most of the existing coke oven facilities
throughout the country, as they would be unable to meet the specified
maximum limits on a continual basis.56 Union participants in the negotia-
tions, who were interested both in preserving jobs and in reducing work-
place emissions, apparently helped to persuade the environmental group
participants that this concern of the steel industry was valid.57 In addition,
the statistical conversion to thirty-day averages allowed EPA and the en-
vironmental group representatives to point to regulatory limits expressed
as numbers that were actually below the numbers specified by Congress
in the statute. For example, the statute requires a maximum of eight per-
cent leaking doors in the 1993 limits, while the regulation specifies seven
percent leaking doors.58 Even though this difference is simply an artifact
54. See Branscome Interview, supra note 53; see also Telephone Interview with
Amanda Agnew, Office of Air Quality, Emission Standards Division, U.S. EPA, Research
Triangle Park, N.C. (Dec. 1, 1997); Preamble, supra note 41.
55. As the statute itself does not specify any given period for which the limits must
be maintained, the statutory limits appear on their face to be daily maximum requirements(i.e., numbers that may not be exceeded on any given day). According to EPA consultant
Marvin Branscome, however, the negotiated rulemaking committee interpreted the legisla-
tive history of section 112's coke oven provisions as indicating that the intention was for
the statutory numbers to apply as the average of three consecutive "runs" of the coke oven
battery. A "run" is a period of time during which a visual observation of coke oven emis-
sions is made according to EPA-prescribed methods. As there will typically be one run per
day, a three-run average is effectively a three-day average, and a 30-run average is effec-
tively a 30-day average. See Branscome Interview, supra note 53. The limits in EPA's ne-
gotiated rule are in terms of a 30-run average. See 40 C.F.R. § 63.309(d)(1) (1998) (speci-
fying a "30-run rolling average of the percent leaking coke oven doors, topside port lids,
and offtake systems . . ."); see also id. § 63.309(d)(2) (specifying a "logarithmic 30-day
rolling average of the seconds of visible emissions per charge .. ").
56. See Branscome Interview, supra note 53; Telephone Interview with Michael
Wright, negotiation participant, United Steelworkers of America, Washington, D.C., (Dec.
8, 1997); Telephone Interview with Roy Huntley, negotiation participant and Staff Engi-
neer, Office of Air Quality, Emission Standards Division, U.S. EPA, Research Triangle
Park, N.C. (Dec. 17, 1997).
57. Due to the nature of coke oven technology, there is a clear link between envi-
ronmental and occupational emissions. The participants in the negotiations formed two
separate caucuses, the industry caucus and the environmental caucus. According to Mi-
chael Wright of the Steelworkers union, who participated in the negotiations, the union
representatives joined the environmental caucus, but served as a "bridge" between the
environmental caucus and the industry caucus. See Wright Interview, supra note 56.
58. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(8)(C) (1994) ("8 per centum leaking doors") with
of the statistical conversion of the statutory number to a thirty-day aver-
age value, it lends the appearance of a more stringent standard.
From a health perspective, however, the regulation may well be less
protective than the standards specified in the statute. There is evidence
that short-term exposure to a certain, amount of carcinogenic materials is
more harmful than exposure to the same amount of those materials, in
smaller daily increments, spread out over a longer term.59 The increased
damage done on the individual days of high exposure levels allowed un-
der the thirty-day average approach, then, may not be offset by the re-
ductions in damage experienced on those days when emissions are below
the required average.
Moreover, it appears clear that the negotiated 1998 limits were not
set according to LAER, which is defined in the CAA as "the most strin-
gent emission limitation that is achieved in practice by [the] class or
category of source," with no consideration of the cost of meeting that
emission limitation.60 That is, a LAER limit is to be based on the emis-
sion levels being attained by the best-performing existing plant within
the particular industry class or category. The best-performing coke oven
facility in operation in the United States at the time was the Jewell
Smokeless plant, in Vansant, Virginia, owned by Sun Coal. This facility
employs a nonrecovery coke oven technology, while all of the other coke
oven plants in the country employ the older, and dirtier, by-product re-
covery technology.6 A nonrecovery plant can achieve an emission limit
of 0.0% leaking doors, and has no lids or offtakes.2 Further, nonrecovery
plants produce far less wastewater and hazardous waste than comparable
by-product recovery plants, and also generate excess energy that can be
utilized elsewhere in the facility.63 From an environmental perspective,
the nonrecovery technology is undeniably superior.
Although industry representatives reportedly were concerned that
EPA would base the LAER limits on the performance of the Jewell
Smokeless plant, the negotiated rulemaking committee decided instead to
consider the performance of by-product recovery plants only.64 The
committee apparently focused on the performance of a USX (United
40 C.F.R. § 63.304(b)(1)(i) (1998) ("7.0 percent leaking coke oven doors").
59. See, e.g., Dale Hattis, Pharmacokinetic Principles for Dose-Rate Extrapolation
of Carcinogenic Risk from Genetically Active Agents, 10 RISK ANALYSIS 303 (1990).
60. 42 U.S.C. § 7501(3)(B) (1994). The 1998 limits were to "reflect the lowest
achievable emission rate as defined in section 7501 of this title for a coke oven battery that
is rebuilt or a replacement at a coke oven plant for an existing battery." 42 U.S.C. § 7412
(i)(8)(B)(i) (1994).
61. See Huntley Interview, supra note 56.
62. Accordingly, the MACT limit set by EPA for nonrecovery facilities specifies
0.0% leaking doors, lids, and offtakes. See 40 C.F.R. § 63.303(b) (1998).
63. See Branscome Interview, supra note 53.
64. See Huntley Interview, supra note 56. EPA does have discretion under section
112 to "distinguish among classes, types, and sources within a category or subcategory in
establishing ... standards .... " 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(1) (1994).
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States Steel) plant in Clariton, Pennsylvania, which the committee ap-
pears to have deemed the best-performing by-product recovery facility.6 5
Yet, as noted, the committee set the 1998 limits simply by specifying
percentages that were calculated to be the "statistical equivalent" of the
least stringent permissible limits specified in the statute. If the committee
took this approach because it believed that this was the best that by-
product recovery plants could do, this appears to have been a significant
error in assessment.
The negotiated 1998 limits (expressed as thirty-day averages) are
4.3% leaking doors for tall doors and foundry doors, and 3.8% leaking
doors for all other doors. 66 As LAER limits, these limits were required by
statute to be representative of the very best performance within the in-
dustry. An EPA survey of by-product recovery plants done six months
after these limits were promulgated in 1993, however, found that most
plants were easily meeting the 1998 limits, and that some plants were
averaging one to two percent leaking doors.67 In other words, the best
performance in the industry was considerably better than what the 1998
limits allow. Subsequent EPA surveys of the industry revealed that the
performance of many of the plants worsened somewhat thereafter, but
was still comfortably in compliance with the legally applicable 1993
limits.68 This suggests that the plants may have initially been testing their
technology to ensure that they could meet the 1998 limits.69 In August
1997, with the 1998 limits due to become enforceable within a few
months, most of the plants were again meeting the 1998 limits on a con-
tinuous basis, and roughly three out of every five of the plants had maxi-
mum (as opposed to thirty-day average) values of less than two percent
leaking doors.70
The CAA also specifies that, by January 2007, EPA is to review the
1998 LAER limits for coke oven facilities, and "revise [them], as neces-
sary ... to reflect the lowest achievable emission rate as defined . . . at
the time," with such revised limits to become effective on January 1,
2010.71 Rather than waiting until later to set the revised LAER standard,
65. See id. (noting that "most of the data used" came from the Clariton plant);
Wright Interview, supra note 56 (noting that the Clariton facility was deemed the best-
performing plant). The preamble to the proposed standard does not explain how the 1998
LAER limits were set. See Preamble, supra note 41.
66. See 40 C.F.R. § 63.304(b)(2)(i) (1998).
67. See Huntley Interview, supra note 56.
68. See id.
69. This apparently was the opinion of many EPA field staff. See id.
70. See id.; Emission Factor & Inventory Group, U.S. EPA, Battery Performance
Data Survey (August 1997) (unpublished data, on file with the Harvard Environmental
Law Review). The survey included 23 of the 26 plants in operation, which represented 60
of the 66 operating coke oven batteries. Roy Huntley reported in the survey that 83% of the
batteries surveyed were meeting the 1998 limits continuously, and that 62% had maximum
values of two percent or less.
71. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(i)(8)(C) (1994).
so that it could assess technological improvements made in response to
the 1993 and 1998 limits, EPA adopted the recommendation of the nego-
tiated rulemaking committee to set the 2010 standard as part of the 1993
rule. Again based on performance data from the United States Steel plant
in Clariton, the limits for 2010 are only slightly more stringent than their
1998 counterparts, and are considerably less stringent than what the cur-
rent data indicate the best-performing by-product recovery plants could
meet.72 The statutory criteria for LAER, then, simply were not met.
EPA was also required to promulgate section 112 emission limits for
new coke oven sources.73 Once again, the negotiated rule appears to fall
short of the statutory mark. The problem is one of scope as well as one of
substance. Section 112 defines "new source" as "a stationary source the
construction or reconstruction of which is commenced after the [EPA]
first proposes regulations under this section establishing an emission
standard applicable to such source." 74 By the terms of the statute, then, a
"new" coke oven source includes both the construction of a wholly new
coke oven plant and the reconstruction of an existing plant to install a
new coke oven battery. Under the terms of the regulation, however, a re-
constructed coke oven plant becomes a "new" source only if the new
coke oven batteries "increase the design capacity" of the facility.75 This
removes an entire class of reconstructed facility from the ambit of the
new source standard, and allows existing plants that do not expand their
operations to replace coke oven batteries without making any improve-
ments in technology.76
Moreover, new source limits under section 112 are to be "not less
stringent than the emission control that is achieved in practice by the best
controlled similar source," without regard to cost. 77 As the Jewell
Smokeless nonrecovery plant in Virginia was the best-performing coke
72. The 2010 standard is 4.0% leaking doors for tall doors and foundry doors, and
3.3% leaking doors for all other doors. The 2010 standard does not impose new limits for
the other parts of the standard (percentage leaking lids, percentage leaking offtakes, and
number of seconds per charge). See 40 C.F.R. § 63.304(b)(3) (1998).
73. Like the limits for existing coke oven sources, the limits for new [coke oven]
sources were to be promulgated by December 31, 1992. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7412(d)(8)(A) (re-
quiring the setting of limits under "paragraph[ ] ... 3) of this subsection for coke oven
batteries"), 7412(d)(3) (requiring the setting of emission standards "for new sources")
(1994).
74. Id. § 7412(a)(4) (emphasis added).
75. 40 C.F.R. § 63.300(b) (1998). Except for certain specified facilities which were
under construction when the 1990 CAA amendments were passed, the date at which exist-
ing design capacity is deemed established under the regulation is November 15, 1990, the
date of the 1990 amendments.
76. In contrast, EPA's general regulations for implementation of the pre-construction
review requirements of section 112(i)(1) specify that "[u]pon reconstruction, an affected
source is subject to relevant standards for new sources, including compliance dates, irre-
spective of any change in emissions of hazardous air pollutants from that source." 43
C.F.R. § 63.5(b)(1) (1997).
77. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(3) (1994).
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oven plant in the United States, one would have expected it to have been
the model for EPA's new source standards.78 Indeed, Congress specified
that, in setting new source limits for coke oven facilities, the agency
"shall evaluate ... the Jewell design Thompson non-recovery coke oven
batteries and other non-recovery coke oven technologies." 79 Nonetheless,
the negotiated rulemaking committee chose to set two new source stan-
dards, one for nonrecovery batteries and one for by-product recovery
batteries.80 New sources choosing nonrecovery technology must meet a
limit of 0.0% leaking doors, lids, and offtakes, while new sources
choosing by-product recovery technology need only outperform the 2010
limits: 4.0% leaking doors for tall and foundry doors, 3.3% leaking doors
for other doors, 0.4% leaking lids, and 2.5% leaking offtakes.81
A final noteworthy feature of the negotiated rule is its requirement
that compliance monitoring be done on a daily basis, by "certified ob-
servers" who are independent of the coke oven facility but whose funding
comes from the industry. 2 Although there have been problems in secur-
ing the true "independence" of the observers, 83 there appears to be little
question that the rule has enhanced both the frequency and the accuracy
of the compliance monitoring. By all accounts, these monitoring im-
provements are a direct result of the negotiated rulemaking process.84
78. The Jewell Smokeless plant certainly would seem to be a "similar source"
within the meaning of section 112. Although the powerful by-product recovery faction of
the industry argued to the negotiated rulemaking committee that the coke produced by the
nonrecovery process was of inferior quality, they apparently did not convince the commit-
tee on this score. See Huntley Interview, supra note 56; Branscome Interview, supra note
53. And, while the two types of plants differ in the fact that one produces by-products
while the other does not, the clear purpose of both is to produce coke.
79. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(8)(A) (1994).
80. Although section 112(d)(1) gives EPA general authority to "distinguish among
classes, types, and sizes of sources within a category or subcategory," see 42 U.S.C.
§ 7412 (d)(1) (1994), the specific references to nonrecovery technology in section
112(d)(8)(A) would appear to indicate a congressional intent to move beyond by-product
recovery technology for new coke ovens.
81. Compare 40 C.F.R. § 63.303(b) (new source standards for nonrecovery batter-
ies) with 40 C.F.R. § 63.302(b)-(d) (1998) (new source standards for new by-product re-
covery batteries). A new by-product recovery source must either meet the limits for a new
nonrecovery source or utilize "a new recovery technology, including but not limited to
larger size ovens, operation under negative pressure, and processes with emission points
different from those regulated under this [regulation]," and meet emission limits that are
"less than" the 2010 limits. 40 C.F.R. § 63.302(b)-(d) (1998).
82. 40 C.F.R. § 63.301 (defining "certified observer"), 63.309 (1998) (requiring ob-
servations to be done seven days a week when the plant is operating).
83. The rule calls for the observers to be employed by EPA, but the agency later
concluded that it did not have the authority to act as an "employer" in this capacity. Re-
portedly, at least in some areas of the country, the "independent" observer thus is not only
paid by the coke oven facility, but actually has an office at the plant, and effectively is a
company employee. Apparently, there is a move afoot to have state and/or local govern-
ment assume employment responsibility for the certified observers. See Huntley Interview,
supra note 56.
84. EPA's Roy Huntley recalls that this was not an item that had been sought by
EPA or environmental group representatives, but rather was something that the industry
Overall, however, the rule fashioned by the negotiators was not de-
signed to secure optimal environmental performance from coke oven fa-
cilities. The rule provides a framework wherein facilities are assured that,
at least until the 2020 statutory target date for health-based limits, emis-
sion limits will be attainable through the use of inferior, pre-1993 tech-
nology.85 Indeed, an EPA official noted at the time that companies
choosing the "extension track" would be assured that any improvements
made to their plants when the rule went into effect in 1993 would be the
last they would be required to make for almost thirty years.8 6 Although
this could change if the agency decides to tighten the 2010 limits before
the 2007 deadline,87 the regulation clearly is not designed to encourage
diffusion of the cleaner nonrecovery technology within the industry,
much less to spur any further wholesale improvements in coke oven
technology. Further, while EPA touted the negotiated rule as a triumph
for "environmental justice" (because coke oven plants tend to be located
in heavily industrialized, lower-income areas),88 the effect of the negoti-
ated new source standards will be to discourage the use of the cleaner
technology in those areas until at least 2020.
This is not to say that the result achieved by the negotiated rule-
making committee may not represent an appropriate balancing of envi-
ronmental and economic concerns in its approach to a troubled industry.
A major stumbling block to tying emission limits to the performance of
nonrecovery technology, apparently, was the relatively high capital cost
of replacing an existing by-product recovery battery with a new nonre-
covery battery.89 In addition, there was a concern about jobs. A nonre-
covery facility typically employs fewer workers than a by-product recov-
ery facility. Requiring improved performance at existing by-product re-
covery plants, however, actually created jobs.90 Negotiated rulemaking
appears to have been an ideal vehicle for the discussion of these issues,
and for the sharing of information that appears to have been necessary to
representatives simply offered to do at one negotiating session. See id. Presumably, indus-
try representatives believed that this would help them achieve their broader goals at the
negotiations. Michael Wright of the Steelworkers union recalls that this item was not
viewed as a major concession by the industry. See Wright Interview, supra note 56.
85. Presumably, unless Congress relaxes the requirements of section 112 at the re-
quest of the steel industry, any meaningful health-based standard set by EPA (which, as
noted, is required by section 112 to ensure that the cancer risk is no more than one in one
million) would effectively require a move to nonrecovery technology.
86. This comment is attributed to William G. Rosenberg, Assistant Administrator
for Air and Radiation. See Year-Long Coke Oven Negotiations, supra note 39.
87. The regulation leaves open this possibility. The specified limits for 2010 will
apply "unless the Administrator [of EPA] promulgates more stringent limits." 40 C.F.R.
§ 63.304(b)(3) (1998).
88. See, e.g., Final Rule on Coke Ovens Means Victory for 'Environmental Justice,'
Browner Says, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1169-70 (1993).
89. Replacing a by-product recovery battery with a nonrecovery battery requires re-
construction of the entire surrounding structure. See Branscome Interview, supra note 53.
90. See Wright Interview, supra note 56.
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convince the environmental group representatives to accept the less strin-
gent emission limitations favored by industry.91
However, had the goal instead been to "push" the industry toward
markedly better technology, and thus to risk some short-term dislocation
within the industry, it is not at all clear that negotiation would have been
the best approach. The fact that EPA so grossly underestimated the per-
formance capability of even the existing by-product recovery technology
suggests that the agency's limited resources were directed more at en-
suring a "successful" negotiation than at ensuring that its technological
and economic database was a reliable one.92 Had EPA instead used those
resources to take a hard look at what the industry could do, now and in
the future, it is likely that the agency could have crafted a rule that met
the environmental goals of the Clean Air Act and created meaningful
incentives for the use of better technology.93
c. The Wood Furniture Coatings Rule
Another section 112 regulation that was drafted largely through ne-
gotiated rulemaking was the hazardous air pollutant emission standard
for the wood furniture industry. After a series of public meetings with
representatives from industry, environmental groups, and state govern-
ment in late 1992 and early 1993, EPA convened a negotiated rulemaking
committee to attempt to formulate a rule governing wood furniture (sur-
face coatings) nationwide. The committee held its first meeting in July
1993, and a proposed rule, largely drafted by the committee, was issued
in December 1994. The timing of this promulgation likely was influenced
by (if not wholly determined by) the fact that the Sierra Club, a private,
nonprofit environmental group, had sued EPA in 1993 to compel the issu-
ance of several rules under section 112. A consent decree entered in that
case called for the promulgation of this proposed rule by November 21,
91. EPA also credits negotiated rulemaking for having kept the coke oven rule out of
the courts. See Agnew Interview, supra note 54. Most of the credit for this properly goes to
Congress, however, for having devised a statutory "default" standard for the extension
track, which would have gone into effect had a standard not been negotiated by December
31, 1992, that was more stringent than what the steel industry was able to obtain through
negotiation. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
92. Reportedly, the negotiated rulemaking process took an "immense" amount of
agency resources. Huntley Interview, supra note 56. Most of the performance and cost data
used in the negotiations apparently came from the steel industry and from the union.
Throughout the negotiations, steel industry representatives insisted that the emission re-
ductions under consideration would be extremely expensive and extremely difficult to
meet. See id.; Branscome Interview, supra note 53; Wright Interview, supra note 56.
93. The potential economic viability of the nonrecovery technology, even in
retrofitted existing plants, is highlighted by the fact that Inland Steel currently is replacing
by-product recovery batteries with nonrecovery batteries at one of its plants. See Huntley
Interview, supra note 56; Branscome Interview, supra note 53; Wright Interview, supra
note 56. The key economic factor appears to be the energy savings that are available
through the use of the nonrecovery technology. See Branscome Interview, supra note 53.
1994.94 The final rule-virtually unchanged from the proposed rule-was
promulgated on December 7, 1995,95 although portions of the rule were
challenged in court by the chemical industry.96
Based on the committee's work, EPA determined that wood furni-
ture manufacturers performed four basic operations in producing a
finished product-finishing, gluing, cleaning, and washoff-and the pro-
posed rule contained standards for each. All but the gluing operation
standards were drafted by the committee. The standards for the gluing
operations were developed "outside of the regulatory negotiation process,
because adhesive suppliers were not represented on the Committee."9 7
EPA estimated that more than 11,000 facilities were included within the
wood furniture industrial source category, and that approximately 750 of
these would be considered "major" (as defined by the rule), and thus
subject to these regulations under section 112.98
As EPA noted in the preamble to the proposed regulation, "a regu-
latory negotiation process . . . often requires concessions from some par-
ties in exchange for concessions from other parties .... "99 Considered as
a whole, the wood furniture rule might well be viewed as a compromise
of the stringency of emission levels in exchange for a clear focus on
pollution prevention (as opposed to simply "end-of-pipe" emission con-
trol).'00
For example, section 112(d) specifies that EPA "may distinguish
among classes, types, and sizes of sources within a category or subcate-
gory in establishing [technology-based] standards" for the emission of
94. Sierra Club v. EPA, No. 93-0124 (D.D.C.) (consent decree entered Feb. 23,
1994).
95. See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Final Standards
for Hazardous Air Pollutant Emissions from Wood Furniture Manufacturing Operations, 60
Fed. Reg. 62, 930, 62,936 (1995) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 63.800-.808).
96. In three separate actions filed in the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia, the Chemical Manufacturer's Association, the Society of the Plastics
Industry, and the Halogenated Solvents Industry Alliance challenged that portion of the
rule that lists certain chemicals as Volatile Hazardous Air Pollutants ("VHAPs") of Poten-
tial Concern. See Coglianese, supra note 19, at 1305. The rule requires facilities to monitor
their use of these designated VHAPs and establish a "baseline" annual usage. Any increase
above this baseline that does not meet one of four designated criteria is to result in efforts
by the facility to decrease its use of these chemicals, so long as the facility and the state
agree that such reduction would be practical.
97. National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Proposed Standards
for Hazardous Air Pollutant Emissions From Wood Furniture Mfg. Operations, 59 Fed.
Reg. 62,652, 62,654 (1994) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63) (proposed Dec. 6, 1994)
[hereinafter "NESHAP"].
98. Id. at 62,664.
99. Id. at 62,654.
100. Under the Pollution Prevention Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 13101-13109
(1994), EPA is charged to "develop and implement a strategy to promote source reduction"
in preference to pollution control. Id. § 13103(b). The Act defines "source reduction" as
including "equipment or technology modifications, process or procedure modifications,
reformulation or redesign of products, substitution of raw materials, and improvements in
housekeeping, maintenance, training, or inventory control." Id. § 13103(5)(A).
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hazardous air pollutants. °0 Rather than distinguish among the techno-
logical and economic capabilities of particular wood furniture industry
segments, however, the committee proposed-and EPA accepted-an
industry-wide standard. Accordingly, EPA dismissed the suggestion that
it require the use of "finishing materials with a very low- or zero-HAP
[hazardous air pollutant] content," on the basis that such materials "have
not been demonstrated to be feasible for all industry segments."'0 2 Had
EPA divided the industry into subcategories for regulatory purposes,
however, it appears that lower emissions of hazardous air pollutants
could have been achieved in certain sectors through the required use of
these finishing materials where such use would be feasible.'03
Further, in the part of the rule dealing with restrictions on certain
work practices known to be associated with the release of hazardous air
pollutants,'04 the committee specified a list of solvents to be forbidden
from use in cleaning or "washoff" activities. Agency technical personnel
believed that the committee's list of the chemicals to be so restricted was
too narrow. As noted by EPA in the preamble:
Some agency officials have expressed concern that the proposed
rule only restricts the use of EPA type A and type B1/B2 carcino-
gens in cleaning and washoff solvents. They are concerned that re-
stricting the use of only these chemicals implies that they are worse
than other HAP.'°5
Despite the scientific arguments for including more chemicals on the list,
however, EPA simply accepted the proposed rule as written by the nego-
tiated rulemaking committee: "The Committee agreed to restrict the use
101. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(1) (1994).
102. NESHAP, supra note 97, at 62,667 (emphasis added).
103. The preamble to the proposed rule indicates that the committee had divided the
industry into several subcategories, such as kitchen cabinet manufacturers, residential fur-
niture manufacturers, and upholstered furniture manufacturers, for other purposes. See id.
at 62,666.
104. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(h)(1) (1994) specifically allows EPA to promulgate work
practice standards in lieu of emission standards for sources of hazardous air pollution for
which an emission standard would not be feasible.
105. NESHAP, supra note 97, at 62,673. EPA further noted that these agency
officials:
are also concerned that the rule draws a clear line between type B and type C
carcinogens, although the scientific evidence does not suggest such a clear
distinction. For example, some pollutants on the HAP list are designated type
B/C because the data cannot clearly support a designation of type B or C. The
proposed rule does not address these pollutants. Finally, the Agency is plan-
ning to update [its] risk assessment guidelines. Under these revised guidelines,
the terms type A and type B carcinogens are likely to be meaningless.
Id.
of type A and type B,/B 2 carcinogens only, so the EPA is proposing the
rule using this approach.""'
Nonetheless, while the rule drafted by the committee is less strin-
gent than it likely could have been, it is designed to encourage pollution
prevention. Thus it could ultimately result in changes in technology and
practices that reduce emissions below the levels required by the rule.
Further, the emphasis on pollution prevention has the advantage of pro-
viding protection both to the environment and to workers, and is consis-
tent with the goals of the Pollution Prevention Act.' 07 Rather than focus-
ing on the use of control technology to reduce emissions, the committee
endeavored to select a format that would "accommodate multiple compli-
ance techniques for the various industry segments."'08 For finishing op-
erations, the committee chose to express the required emission limit in
terms of kilograms (or pounds) of volatile hazardous air pollutants emit-
ted per kilogram (or pound) of solids contained in the finishing materials
used. EPA noted this method of expressing the limit was chosen because
"sources are encouraged to reduce the quantity of HAP through
reformulation measures."'09
Significant attention was paid to pollution prevention in the drafting
of work practice rules as well. As mentioned above, the use of certain
solvents is banned in cleaning and washoff operations. In addition, the
use of solvents in spray booth cleaning is prohibited except in limited
circumstances, and sources are required to maintain a "solvent account-
ing system" to track the use of solvents in cleaning and washoff." ° As
noted by the agency, "although it cannot be assumed that it will actually
result in ... reduction, the cleaning and washoff solvent accounting sys-
tem may prompt facilities to eliminate inefficient uses of solvent.""'
The fact that this rule included a substantial emphasis on pollution
prevention is not surprising. Both the decentralized industry profile, and
the relatively straightforward and uncomplicated opportunities for
chemical substitution and use reduction, made this industry an ideal can-
didate for pollution prevention."' Nonetheless, it does appear that the use
of negotiated rulemaking facilitated the agency's focus on pollution pre-
vention in the development of the rule. It seems likely that the active
106. Id.
107. See Pollution Prevention Act, supra note 100.
108. NESHAP, supra note 97, at 62,668.
109. Id. at 62,675.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. For example, the fact that input substitutions (such as using paints or solvents
that are less toxic) can be done without major modifications to the production process
makes pollution prevention easier to achieve here than in industries with more inflexible
processes. Further, the fact that the industry is comprised of hundreds of small shops,
rather than a small number of large ones, makes it more difficult for the industry to exert
collective economic pressure against change, and also means there will be considerably
more opportunity for experimentation and variation.
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participation of industry representatives (who are in the best position to
identify productive opportunities for pollution prevention) helped to both
deepen and legitimize the committee's efforts to build pollution preven-
tion into the rule.
Moreover, the committee negotiations produced an agreement, out-
side of the parameters of the rule, under which the industry agreed to
prepare a semiannual "trends report," beginning in 1994, which would
contain "a brief discussion of technologies being used by the industry to
reduce emissions, and a discussion of evolving technologies including
new finishing materials, adhesives, and improved application equip-
ment.""3 This agreement reflects the belief-apparently shared by many
committee members-that "new, lower emitting (both VOC [volatile or-
ganic compound] and HAP) technologies ... are ... on the threshold of
demonstration." 114 In addition, to help determine whether the rule actu-
ally results in the targeted reductions in hazardous air pollutant emis-
sions, and to determine whether those emission reductions are being met
through the substitution of other hazardous chemicals that are not regu-
lated as hazardous air pollutants, the trends report is to include a chemi-
cal use and emission survey from a representative sample of the indus-
try.ll 5
d. Evaluation
The following table summarizes the results of these three negotiated
rulemakings in terms of the substantive criteria suggested at the outset:
environmental/public health protection and technological change.
TECHNOLOGICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF THREE
AIR EMISSION STANDARDS
NEGOTIATED
Diffusion Innovation Short-Term Long-Term
Env't. Gain Env't. Gain
Woodstoves +/- +
Coke Ovens +/- +
Wood Fur- + (PP) + (PP) + +
niture
113. NESHAP, supra note 97, at 62,680.
114. Id.
115. See id. at 62,679-80 (noting that "[b]ecause the emission limits for finishing
materials can be met through substitution of non-HAP VOCs for HAP, and some non-
HAP's can be as hazardous as the listed HAP's, [the committee] felt it was important to
track emissions of other pollutants from the industry to ensure that materials of equal or
greater toxicity were not being substituted for HAP .. .").
The first two columns focus on the particular rulemaking's potential
to effect technological change within the regulated industry, where "diffu-
sion" refers to the diffusion of an environmentally superior existing tech-
nology within the industry, and "innovation" refers to the development of a
new technology that either produces greater environmental gains than ex-
isting technology or produces equal gains at a lower cost. The second two
columns refer to the rulemaking's potential to effect improvements in pub-
lic health or the environment, where "short-term" gains are those that are
achieved before new and better technology is developed, and "long-term"
gains are those that are achieved when new and better technology is devel-
oped and fully implemented.
The woodstoves rulemaking did not seek to push the envelope of
woodstove technology, and focused instead on the diffusion of existing
control technology. It is assigned a "+/-" rating in the Diffusion column
because it set a different emission standard for each of the two types of
woodstove technologies on the market, rather than seeking to devise a
standard that would diffuse the superior technology throughout the in-
dustry. This resulted in short-term environmental gain, but did not create
a strong, consistent signal designed to encourage the kind of innovation
in woodstove technology that might produce greater environmental gain
in the long-term.
The profile for the coke oven rule is quite similar. Rather than
seeking to diffuse the cleaner existing (nonrecovery) technology, the coke
oven rule focused on the use of readily available control techniques to
improve the performance of the dominant existing (by-product recovery)
technology, and has resulted in short-term environmental gain. Further,
by setting a standard for new facilities that is not tied to the performance
of the cleaner existing technology, and by setting a 2010 standard for
existing facilities that many firms were meeting easily in 1993, the nego-
tiated rule provides clear incentives for keeping the dirtier technology in
operation longer, thus actually reducing long-term environmental gain.
The wood furniture coatings rule, in contrast, has both a focus on
pollution prevention--denoted as "+ (PP)"-and a focus on innovation. It
can be expected to diffuse existing pollution prevention technologies and,
especially given industry's agreement to prepare the semiannual trends
report, has a real potential to produce innovation (and, concomitantly, to
produce long-term environmental gain).
2. Negotiated Rulemaking and OSHA Toxic Substance Exposure
Standards
Negotiation has also been used as a means of establishing standards
for workplace exposure to toxic substances. Four instances of this type of
negotiation are examined here. It should be noted, however, that these
examples do not all represent formal, agency-sponsored negotiation.
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OSHA has convened a formal "negotiated rulemaking committee" on
only four occasions. Two of these committees dealt with toxic substance
exposure standards (for benzene and 4,4-Methylenedianiline, respec-
tively), and analyses of the corresponding negotiations are presented
here. 16 In addition, two instances in which the interested parties negoti-
ated a proposed standard on their own, with no formal encouragement or
assistance from OSHA, are examined. These negotiations were com-
menced in order to set standards for formaldehyde and butadiene expo-
sures, respectively."'7
Before discussing these four rulemakings, it is important to note
that OSHA has occasionally used its authority under the OSHAct to es-
tablish advisory committees to "assist ... in ... standard-setting func-
tions.""'8 OSHA does not sit as a member of these committees, and it is
not bound by their recommendations. In general, these advisory com-
mittees have been true to their name: committee members have served an
advisory function on technical and policy issues but have not attempted
to negotiate a proposed rule." 9 The advisory committee established by
OSHA to address occupational exposure to coke oven emissions repre-
sents an exception. This committee did in fact negotiate a set of agree-
ments that formed the basis for the coke oven emissions standard prom-
ulgated by the agency in 1976.120 An analysis of the coke oven emissions
standard has not been included here.
a. The Benzene Standard
In 1971, as required by the passage of the OSHAct in 1970, OSHA
adopted several "national consensus standards" for occupational expo-
116. OSHA has also convened formal negotiated rulemaking committees to devise
safety standards for erection of steel structures, see Safety Standards for Steel Erection, 59
Fed. Reg. 24,389 (1994) (proposed May 5, 1994) (codified at 59 C.F.R. pt. 1926), and to
devise fire protection standards for the maritime community, see Safety Standards Fire
Protection in Shipyard Employment, 61 Fed. Reg. 28,824 (1994) (proposed May 30, 1994)
(codified at 29 C.F.R. pt 1915). Both rulemakings are ongoing.
117. A third such situation, in which labor and industry met on their own to try to
resolve certain issues involving OSHA's cotton dust standard, also is discussed briefly. See
infra notes 208-211 and accompanying text.
118. This authorization is contained in section 7(b) of the OSHAct, 29 U.S.C.
§ 656(b) (1994), which deals specifically with the establishment of OSHAct advisory
committees. In addition, section 6 of the OSHAct, which contains OSHA's standard-
setting authority, specifies that OSHA may, in devising an occupational safety or health
standard, "request the recommendations of an advisory committee appointed under section
[7] .... " 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(1) (1994).
119. See generally Ashford, supra note 13 (describing the operation of OSHA and
EPA advisory committees).
120. See Henry A. Perritt, Jr., Negotiated Rulemaking Before Federal Agencies:
Evaluation of Recommendations by the Administrative Conference of the United States, 74
GEO. L.J. 1625, 1682 (1986). The standard was promulgated at 41 Fed. Reg. 46,741 (1976)
(codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1910).
sures to hazardous substances.' 2 ' One such standard involved a require-
ment that occupational exposures to benzene not exceed a permissible
exposure limit ("PEL") of ten parts per million ("ppm"), measured as a
time-weighted eight-hour average concentration in workplace air.'22
In 1974, however, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and
Health ("NIOSH") issued a report implicating benzene as a possible
cause of leukemia.l23 Revisions to this report, issued in 1976, concluded
that "no safe level of exposure to benzene could be established" and rec-
ommended that the OSHA standard be reduced to one ppm, the lowest
level at which benzene could be detected using practical and reliable
monitoring technology.'24 Prompted by these findings, OSHA conducted
a traditional notice and comment rulemaking and promulgated a new
benzene standard which limited exposures to the recommended one ppm
level.' 25
Industry challenged the new standard, and the United States Su-
preme Court remanded the standard to the agency in 1980.126 In a plural-
ity opinion, four justices concluded that OSHA could not promulgate a
standard limiting exposure to a hazardous substance unless the agency
demonstrated that the standard was necessary to reduce a significant risk
of material health impairment.' 27 Three justices found that OSHA had
failed to produce sufficient evidence to demonstrate that benzene expo-
sures below ten ppm posed a significant risk of harm.' 28
In 1983, under pressure from a public interest group for a revision
to the standard, 29 OSHA attempted to formulate a new proposed standard
through negotiated rulemaking.' 30 The benzene rule was considered to be
121. This was mandated by section 6(a) of the OSHAct. 29 U.S.C. § 655(a) (1994).
122. See Part 1910-Occupational Safety and Health Standards; National Consen-
sus Standards and Established Federal Standards, 36 Fed. Reg. 10,466 (1971) (codified at
29 C.F.R. pt. 1910).
123. See Perritt, supra note 120, at 1647-48.
124. See Emergency Temporary Standard for Occupational Exposure to Benzene;
Notice of Hearing, 42 Fed. Reg. 22,516 (1977) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1910).
125. See Occupational Exposure to Benzene, 43 Fed. Reg. 5918 (1978), as
amended, Occupational Exposure to Benzene; Liquid Mixtures, 43 Fed. Reg. 27,962
(1978) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1910).
126. See Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S.
607 (1980).
127. See id. at 642-46.
128. See id. at 652-58. In the administrative record, OSHA had justified the one
ppm standard with the argument that, since benzene is a carcinogen, and since there is no
known safe level of exposure to a carcinogen, any exposure posed a risk of harm. Justice
Stevens' plurality opinion (which was joined on this point only by Justice Burger and Jus-
tice Stewart) concluded that this was inadequate because the agency had not demonstrated
that the risk was "significant." "OSHA," noted the plurality, "did not even attempt to carry
its burden of proof' on this issue. Id. at 653.
129. Renewed activity on the benzene standard came after an April 14, 1983, peti-
tion to OSHA from Dr. Sidney Wolfe of the Public Citizen Health Research Group, re-
questing that OSHA issue an emergency temporary standard for benzene. See Perritt, supra
note 120, at 1650.
130. See Occupational Exposure to Benzene, 48 Fed. Reg. 31,412-13 (1983)
164 Harvard Environmental Law Review [Vol. 23 1999]
Environmental and Occupational Negotiation 167
a good candidate for negotiated rulemaking, since the parties and issues
had been well-defined during the previous administrative and judicial
proceedings. OSHA also recognized, however, that the very same pro-
ceedings had tended to polarize and solidify the viewpoints of opposing
interests. 13 '
Although the benzene negotiations did help to further identify and
narrow the issues to be resolved, they did not result in a proposed rule.
One explanation for this result is that the complexity of the issues to-
gether with the structure of the negotiations predisposed the process to
failure.' 32 The petroleum industry's concern about tort liability for ben-
zene exposures, for example, has been cited as an especially difficult is-
sue for the negotiators.'33 All of the participants, as well as OSHA, be-
lieved that any revised standard would have to meet the "significant risk"
test articulated by the Supreme Court. As a result, the petroleum industry
feared an official agency declaration that benzene posed a significant risk
at a particular exposure level. Since a declaration of this type might lead
to enhanced tort liability for exposures at or above the indicated level,
industry representatives pushed for a proposed rule which de-emphasized
the issue of risk. This, in turn, proved difficult for the negotiators to fit
within the OSHAct framework. In the words of commentator Henry Per-
ritt, "[the petroleum industry] hoped to frame a risk finding that would
recognize a risk at ... 10 ppm, but [that] would not say that a risk existed
at the new [standard]. The participants, however, were unable to develop
language that satisfied both the tort and statutory criteria."'34
It has been suggested that substantive problems such as this were
exacerbated by structural inadequacies. For example, although OSHA
organized and provided part of the financial support for the negotiations,
no OSHA representative was present at the meetings of the negotiating
committee. Perritt has asserted that OSHA's absence from the negotia-
tions was a significant impediment to success: "nonparticipation by ...
OSHA gave it less of a stake in successful negotiations, and therefore
less motivation to use its ultimate power to create incentives for parties to
(codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1910).
131. For a detailed discussion of the "appropriateness" of the benzene issue for ne-
gotiated rulemaking, see Perritt, supra note 120, at 1653-54.
132. See id.
133. Benzene was present in the gasoline fumes to which many persons-consumers
and employees both-were routinely exposed at filling stations.
134. Perritt, supra note 120, at 1654. Reportedly, there were differences of opinion
among the affected industries as to what an appropriate standard would be. The rubber
industry had been meeting an exposure level of one ppm since the late 1970s. The petro-
leum and chemical industries believed that they could meet the one ppm level only 85% to
90% of the time, and thus wanted a two ppm standard. The steel industry was having trou-
ble meeting even the existing ten ppm standard, and opposed any reduction in the standard.
Labor, on the other hand, did not wish to retreat from the one ppm standard originally
proposed by OSHA. See id. at 1651.
negotiate meaningfully."'35 This argument is attenuated, however, by the
subsequent success of the formaldehyde and butadiene negotiations. The
final formaldehyde and butadiene rules were negotiated by labor and in-
dustry without the participation or the sponsorship of the agency, which
would seem to diminish the significance of OSHA's absence from the
benzene negotiations.
Moreover, it appears that another, less subtle force was at work in
helping to scuttle the benzene negotiations. Michael Wright, who partici-
pated in the negotiations on behalf of the United Steelworkers of Amer-
ica, reports that, in his opinion, "good progress" was being made on
crafting a final standard on which all sides could agree until attorney C.
Boyden Gray, on behalf of Vice President George Bush, contacted both
labor and industry and assured them that the Administration would not
approve any benzene rule with which they were unhappy.l36 Industry rep-
resentatives reportedly took this as an assurance from the Reagan, Ad-
ministration that no benzene rule need be promulgated, and their interest
in pushing forward with the negotiations waned accordingly.'37
After the negotiations stalled, the Steelworkers and others sued
OSHA in an attempt to force the promulgation of a revised standard.'38 In
response, OSHA submitted a rulemaking schedule to the court in which it
committed to promulgating a revised benzene standard according to a
specified schedule. 39 OSHA published the final standard in 1987.'4
Significantly, the maximum permissible exposure limit was the same
as it had been under the standard that had been invalidated seven years
earlier by the Supreme Court: one ppm. The difference was that OSHA
took pains in the administrative record to explain in detail its scientific
basis for setting the exposure limit at this level and to perform a quanti-
tative analysis supporting the agency's conclusion that lowering the ben-
zene standard from ten ppm to one ppm would result in the reduction of a
"significant" risk of cancer.' 4 ' In so doing, the agency had the benefit of
135. Id. at 1662.
136. See Wright Interview, supra note 56.
137. See id. Henry Perritt suggests, albeit obliquely, that such forces were at work
as well. Without explanation, he notes that, shortly before the negotiations stalled, "some
industry constituents were becoming convinced that the OMB [the President's Office of
Management and Budget] would block or delay a standard from the OSHA unacceptable to
industry, which made it difficult to achieve unity behind a position." Perritt, supra note
120, at 1664.
138. See United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC v. Rubber Mfrs. Ass'n,
783 F.2d 1117, 1119 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
139. See id.
140. See Occupational Exposure to Benzene; Final Rule, 52 Fed. Reg. 34,460
(1987) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1910).
141. See Occupational Exposure to Benzene; Proposed Rule and Notice of Hearing,
50 Fed. Reg. 50,512 (1985) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1910) (proposed December 10,
1985). OSHA concluded that a reduction in the standard from ten ppm to one ppm "would
result in a reduction in risk of death from leukemia ranging from 43 to 136 per 1000 work-
ers exposed over an occupational lifetime." Id. at 50,533.
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several additional scientific studies that had been completed since the
time of the first benzene rulemaking, including epidemiologic studies
that strongly suggested that benzene posed a higher cancer risk at ten
ppm than at one ppm. 142
Thus, in marked contrast to its first attempt to revise the standard,
OSHA constructed a rulemaking record that would be virtually unassail-
able under any reasoned judicial analysis. This attention to scientific de-
tail in the crafting of the administrative record, together with the filing of
the lawsuit that prompted OSHA to engage the rulemaking process in
earnest, 143 appear to be the factors most responsible for the ultimate suc-
cess of the benzene rule.
b. The MDA Standard
OSHA's next attempt at negotiated rulemaking dealt with worker
exposures to 4,4'-Methylenedianiline ("MDA"), a constituent of paints
and other coating materials. In 1983, EPA issued a notice under the Toxic
Substances Control Act ("TSCA")'44 indicating, on the basis of data from
animal bioassays, that MDA may pose a significant risk of cancer to hu-
mans.'45 Thereafter, EPA began a formal process to gather additional data
on MDA. Two years later, after having determined that MDA posed a
likely cancer risk to workers, EPA issued a notice under section 9 of
TSCA inviting OSHA to take regulatory action under the OSHAct, and
indicating that EPA would take action under TSCA if OSHA declined.'46
In early 1986, OSHA responded by issuing a notice indicating that it had
determined there was a reasonable basis to conclude that MDA posed a
significant risk to the health of exposed workers and that it would pro-
142. See id. at 50,531-35 (summarizing epidemiologic data), 50,538 (noting that
"[s]ince 1978, three major studies of high quality in experimental animals have confirmed
the carcinogenicity of benzene").
143. The lawsuit was filed with the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia on December 10, 1984. In the words of the subsequent opinion in the case issued
by that court on February 25, 1986: "On December 5, 1985, virtually on the eve of oral
argument, the agency filed with the court a copy of a just-issued NOPR [Notice of Pro-
posed Rulemaking], which was subsequently published in the Federal Register on Decem-
ber 10, 1985." United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC, supra note 138, at 1119.
144. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1994).
145. See 4,4'-Methylenedianiline; Initiation of Review, 48 Fed. Reg. 19,078 (1983).
Under TSCA, EPA is required to issue a notice whenever it makes such a finding. See 15
U.S.C. § 2603 (1994). Once a notice has been issued, EPA is required either to take appro-
priate regulatory action to reduce exposure to the chemical in question, or to publish an
explanation of why it believes no regulatory action is necessary.
146. See 4,4 -Methylenedianiline; Decision to Report to the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration, 50 Fed. Reg. 27,674 (1985). Section 9(a)(1) of TSCA, 15 U.S.C.
§ 2608(a)(1) (1994), requires EPA to follow such a process if the agency determines that,
although a chemical poses an "unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment"
(the basis for regulation under TSCA), "such risk may be prevented or reduced to a
sufficient extent by action taken under a Federal law not administered by [EPA]" (such as
the OSHAct).
ceed with appropriate regulatory action.'47 Thereafter, OSHA convened a
negotiated rulemaking committee.' 48
The committee held seven meetings, culminating in the publication
in July 1987 of recommendations for a proposed rule limiting occupa-
tional exposure to MDA.'49 These recommendations were then incorpo-
rated by OSHA into a proposed rule in May 1989, and were promulgated
by OSHA as a final rule in August 1992. 5°0 The standard established an
eight-hour average time-weighted PEL for workplace exposure to MDA
of ten ppb; prior to the promulgation of the standard, average workplace
exposures to MDA were estimated to be in the 250 ppb range.' 5
There were a number of differences between the MDA negotiations
and the benzene negotiations, and many of these may have contributed to
the comparative ease with which the MDA rule was negotiated.' 52 It may
have been important, for example, that the impetus for an MDA regula-
tion came from EPA and that the participants knew that EPA would issue
a regulation if OSHA did not. What likely was more important, however,
was the much more limited number of industries and workers involved
and the relatively modest financial consequences at stake. OSHA esti-
mated that only 400 workers were exposed to MDA' 53 and that the aver-
age cost of complying with the ten ppb standard would be only $5,450
per year per employer (for the purchase and maintenance of personal
protective equipment).' 54 In contrast to the benzene negotiations, then, the
perceived costs to industry were inconsequential.
In its preamble to the final rule, OSHA expressed considerable sup-
port for the use of negotiated rulemaking as the means of developing the
147. See Health and Safety Standards; Occupational Exposure to 4,4'-
Methylenedianiline (MDA), Notice, Response to EPA Under Section 9(a) of the Toxic
Substances Control Act (TSCA), 51 Fed. Reg. 6748 (1986).
148. See Methylenedianiline Negotiated Rulemaking Advisory Committee, 51 Fed.
Reg. 24,452 (1986).
149. See Methylenedianiline (MDA) Mediated Rulemaking Advisory Committee
Recommendations, 52 Fed. Reg. 26,776 (1987).
150. See Occupational Exposure to 4,4'-Methylenedianilene (MDA), 57 Fed. Reg.
35,630 (1992) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 1910 & 1926) [hereinafter "Occupational Expo-
sure to 4,4'-Methylenedianilene"]. The history of the negotiations is set forth in the pre-
amble to the final standard, at 35,632-34. OSHA referred to the negotiations as "Mediated
Rulemaking," and noted that the committee was established "in accordance with the Fed-
eral Advisory Committee Act and section 7(b) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act."
Id. at 35,633. OSHA stated that "the final standard, like the proposed rule, is based pri-
marily on the recommendations made by the MDA Mediated Rulemaking Committee," and
noted that there were only a "few instances" where the standard differed from those rec-
ommendations. Id. at 35,634.
151. See id. at 35,641.
152. See HENRY H. PERRITT, JR., USE OF NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING TO DEVELOP A
PROPOSED OSHA HEALTH STANDARD FOR MDA, reprinted in NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING
SOURCEBOOK, at 661-703 (David M. Pritzker & Deborah S. Dalton eds., 1995).
153. Occupational Exposure to 4,4'-Methylenedianilene, supra note 150, at 35,643.
154. See id. at 35,644.
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MDA exposure standard.'55 Further, the preamble expressed the agency's
belief that the use of negotiated rulemaking had not involved any sa-
crifice of principle for the sake of expediency. Although noting that
"[s]trictly speaking, it appears inappropriate to suggest that human suf-
fering and lives become the trade off items in a mediation attempt,"
OSHA stressed that negotiated rulemaking:
differs from the typical labor-management negotiations[,] where a
limited number of issues must be resolved and bargaining or trade-
off become the method to form a compromise. The key difference
involves the final product expected. On the one hand, a compromise
is reached; on the other hand, a consensus is achieved.'56
In practice, however, this "key difference" between traditionalfife-
ma4i.ag and negotiated rulemaking appears to have been more conceptual
than actual. "Consensus" was defined by the MDA negotiated rulemaking
committee as 75% concurrence of those members of the negotiated rule-
making committee participating in a vote,' 57 which envisions the potential
for compromise by up to twenty-five percent of the members of the
committee. Nonetheless, OSHA committed itself in the notice of negoti-
ated rulemaking to using the results of the negotiations as the basis for its
proposed rule.' 58 Thus, although the committee voted unanimously on
"approximately 90% of the issues,"'5 9 it does appear that the agency ex-
pressed a willingness to accept a compromise position on worker protec-
tion as the basis for its health standard.'6 0
Moreover, OSHA demonstrated a willingness to truncate considera-
tion of the relevant health issues in the interest of producing a rule
through negotiation. Reportedly, OSHA resisted "active participation by
health experts" in the negotiations, because it feared that "committee
meetings would turn into a battle of the experts."' 6 ' Although there were
persons with toxicological backgrounds on the negotiating committee,
155. Negotiation clearly did not result in the expeditious promulgation of the MDA
rule. The recommendations of the negotiated rulemaking committee were published on
July 16, 1987, and the final rule (incorporating the bulk of those recommendations) was
not published until August 12, 1992. See id. at 35,634. The preamble does not explain the
reason for the five-year delay between the conclusion of the negotiations and the promul-
gation of the final standard.
156. Id. at 35,633.
157. See PERRITT, supra note 152, at 689. In the preamble to the final rule, OSHA
acknowledged that the committee had agreed that unanimous agreement was not necessary.
See Occupational Exposure to 4,4'-Methylenedianilene, supra note 150, at 35,633.
158. See PERRITT, supra note 152, at 676.
159. Id. at 690.
160. Perritt stresses that "[t]he value of a flexible consensus rule cannot be empha-
sized too strongly," and believes that the agreement to treat a 75% majority vote as a con-
sensus was one of the reasons that the MDA committee was able to negotiate a proposed
rule while the benzene committee was not. Id. at 690-91.
161. Id. at 688.
some committee members felt that additional access to health profession-
als, especially physicians, would have been helpful.' 62
This is not to say that nothing was gained through the MDA nego-
tiations. The negotiated rule did ultimately result in a substantial de-
crease in worker exposure to the chemical. Further, even if the negotia-
tions themselves did not focus on specific pollution prevention strategies,
the promulgation of the reduced exposure limits tended to create an ad-
ditional incentive for the manufacture of MDA-free coating materials.
Also, committee members reported that the negotiations provided them
access to unpublished MDA data in the possession of other committee
members, and it is likely that the trust established among committee
members during the negotiations was an important factor in these disclo-
sures. 163
c. The Formaldehyde Standard
Formaldehyde, one of the most widely used chemicals in modern
industry, became a regulatory concern in 1979, when a two-year study
conducted by the Chemical Industry Institute of Toxicology concluded
that the chemical causes cancer in rats.' 64 Concern subsequently in-
creased with the development of epidemiologic data over the following
decade.'65 On December 4, 1987, after traditional notice and comment
rulemaking, OSHA issued a formaldehyde standard imposing an eight-
hour time-weighted PEL of 1.0 ppm.' 66 Although OSHA's findings indi-
cated that a PEL of 0.5 ppm would be technologically and economically
"feasible" within the meaning of the OSHAct, 6 7 the agency declined to
162. See id. at 688-89.
163. See id. at 696.
164. For a discussion of the uses of formaldehyde, the Chemical Industry Institute
of Toxicology study, and the early regulatory history of formaldehyde, see Nicholas A.
Ashford, et al., A Hard Look at Federal Regulation of Formaldehyde: A Departure from
Reasoned Decisionmaking, 7 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 297 (1983).
165. See Occupational Exposure to Formaldehyde; Final Rule, 52 Fed. Reg. 46,168,
46,183-201 (1987) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 1910 & 1926).
166. See id. at 46,168.
167. A toxic substance exposure standard is to be set at the level that "most ade-
quately assures, to the extent feasible ... that no employee will suffer material impairment
of health .... " 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1994) (emphasis added). Although OSHA did not
make a specific feasibility finding for a PEL of 0.5 ppm, the agency's analysis showed that
all affected industries could easily comply with a one ppm standard. See Occupational
Exposure to Formaldehyde; Final Rule, supra note 165, at 46,237-42. Further, as noted in
a subsequent study by the Office of Technology Assessment, "t]he feasibility of engi-
neering controls to achieve a PEL substantially below one ppm was discussed in the course
of the rulemaking," and the technology for the development of low-formaldehyde resins
"was commercially well-known at the time." OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CON-
GRESS, GAUGING CONTROL TECHNOLOGY AND REGULATORY IMPACTS IN OCCUPATIONAL
SAFETY AND HEALTH 95 (1995) [hereinafter OTA Report]. Moreover, in a review of the
one ppm standard before the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals (discussed more fully below),
OSHA appears to have conceded that a more stringent standard would be feasible. See
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impose such a limit because it did not believe the attendant risk was
"significant."' 68 Based on its reading of the Supreme Court's benzene
decision, in which a three-justice plurality observed that a risk of death
of one in one thousand is one that a reasonable person might well con-
sider significant,169 OSHA had determined that any risk of less than one
in one thousand would not be "significant" under the OSHAct.'70 Ac-
cordingly, because it had concluded that the risk of cancer posed by for-
maldehyde exposures of 1.0 ppm or lower would be less than one in one
thousand, OSHA determined that any more stringent formaldehyde stan-
dard would not be authorized by the OSHAct.17
The 1.0 ppm standard was challenged in court by a coalition of la-
bor unions, who sought a standard of 0.5 ppm or lower.72 In 1989 the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit re-
manded the standard to OSHA for further consideration.'73 Noting that
OSHA's own factual analysis appeared to indicate that the cancer risk at
formaldehyde levels below 1.0 ppm was greater than one in one thou-
sand, the court directed the agency either to set a more stringent limit or
to explain more fully why it had not done so.'74 Thereafter, the industry
and labor representatives met to attempt to negotiate a modified standard,
and on June 27, 1990, they presented OSHA with a recommendation
calling for a formaldehyde PEL of 0.75 ppm. 175 On May 27, 1992, OSHA
promulgated a final standard setting the limit at the recommended
level. 176
Given the circumstances, it is not surprising that the negotiators
were able to agree on a standard more protective than the one that OSHA
had proposed. First, of course, the court's invalidation of the original 1.0
ppm standard had sent a strong signal to industry that a more stringent
standard would likely be upheld, and the likelihood that OSHA would
determine that a 0.5 ppm standard was feasible had created a reasonable
presumption that the revised standard would be set at that level. Further,
even before OSHA promulgated the 1.0 ppm standard in 1987, industry
concerns over a possible 0.5 ppm standard had prompted the suppliers of
formaldehyde-containing resins to develop new resins containing little or
no formaldehyde. In part, the development of these new products made it
possible for industry to reduce worker formaldehyde exposures at less
than half the pre-promulgation cost estimates.'77 The negotiated 0.75 ppm
standard, then, represented a relatively painless compromise. Indeed, it is
fair to say that the very real threat that a more stringent (0.5 ppm) stan-
dard would be set by traditional rulemaking made possible the negotia-
tion of a less stringent (0.75 ppm) standard.
d. The Butadiene Standard
International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers
of America v. Pendergrass, 878 F.2d 389, 390-91 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (several unions "assert
that OSHA erred in finding that formaldehyde would present no significant risk at the one
ppm level. If they are right, OSHA would be required to tighten the standard, to the point
where there remains no significant risk or where further tightening is infeasible. (They
propose 0.5 ppm, or possibly lower.)" (emphasis added)).
168. See Pendergrass, supra note 167, at 391-92.
169. See Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO, supra note 126, at 655.
170. As noted by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in its review of the formalde-
hyde standard:
While observing in Benzene that determination of a level of significant risk must be
"based largely on policy considerations," the [Supreme] Court also gave an example, say-
ing that "if the odds are one in a thousand that regular inhalation of gasoline vapors that
are 2% benzene will be fatal, a reasonable person might well consider the risk significant
and take appropriate steps to decrease or eliminate it." In this proceeding and in earlier
ones, OSHA appears to have incorporated that observation as a policy norm .... Counsel's
acknowledgement of this standard at oral argument is confirmed by its practice.
Pendergrass, supra note 167, at 392 (citations omitted).
171. In the words of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, OSHA's "refusal to impose
a lower formaldehyde standard" was based on "its finding of insignificant risk at an expo-
sure of 1 ppm." Id. at 391.
172. See id. at 390-91. Industry groups also challenged the formaldehyde standard,
on grounds relating to the standard's labeling requirement, but deferred their challenge
pending OSHA's reappraisal of those issues. See id. at 391.
173. See id. at 400-01.
174. The court's concern centered on the dose/response assumptions made by the
agency in the models it used to predict the risk of cancer from formaldehyde exposure.
OSHA had declined to assume that the dose/response curve is linear at low exposure levels
(that is, to assume that there is a finite, albeit small, risk of cancer at any exposure level)
even though many of the other factual assumptions made by OSHA, in this and other risk
assessments, support the concept of linearity at low exposure levels. See id. at 396.
1,3-Butadiene ("butadiene") is used in the production of synthetic
rubber and in the production of a variety of other chemical products and
intermediaries. As of 1996, an estimated 9700 U.S. workers at 255 fa-
cilities were exposed to this chemical in their workplace.' In 1971,
OSHA had adopted a "national consensus" PEL' 79 for butadiene of 1000
ppm as a time-weighted eight-hour average. In 1983, however, the Na-
tional Toxicology Program released the results of a study indicating that
butadiene causes cancer in rodents.'80 Thereafter, OSHA solicited com-
ments and gathered data for a six-year period,"'8 culminating in the issu-
ance in 1990 of a proposal to lower the butadiene PEL to 2 ppm, with a
175. See Occupational Exposure to Formaldehyde; Response to Court Remand, 56
Fed. Reg. 32,302 (1991) (proposed July 15, 1991).
176. See Occupational Exposure to Formaldehyde, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,290 (1992)
(codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1910).
177. See NICHOLAS A. ASHFORD & CHARLES C. CALDART, TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND
THE WORKING ENVIRONMENT 506 (1996); OTA Report, supra note 167, at 95.
178. See Occupational Exposure to 1,3-Butadiene; Final Rule, 61 Fed. Reg. 56,746,
56,795 (1996) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 1910, 1915, 1926) [hereinafter 1,3-Butadiene
Final Rule].
179. See supra note 121 and accompanying text (explaining promulgation of na-
tional consensus standards).
180. See 1,3-Butadiene Final Rule, supra note 178, at 56,748.
181. See id. at 56,749.
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short-term exposure limit ("STEL,") of 10 ppm over fifteen minutes.'8 2 In
addition, the proposed standard specified an "action level" of 1.0 ppm,
which triggered increased workplace monitoring requirements.' 8 3
During public hearings on the proposed standard in 1991, labor and
industry representatives "began discussions on issues such as the quality
and interpretation of scientific data, carcinogenic causality, permissible
exposure limits, and economic and technological feasibility."'8 4 For some
time thereafter, working outside the formal regulatory process, and with-
out the participation of OSHA, the parties attempted to resolve their dif-
ferences over the proposed standard.' 8 5 Although a number of companies
in the rubber industry reportedly were achieving average butadiene expo-
sure levels of less than 1.0 ppm,' 86 industry was seeking a PEL of 4
ppm.18 7 The union, on the other hand, sought to bring the OSHA standard
in line with the performance of these rubber companies, both to reduce
exposures in other industries and to put "moral" pressure on the rubber
industry to lower exposure world-wide.88
The break in the negotiations reportedly occurred in 1995, after the
release of an epidemiologic study, funded by the International Institute of
Synthetic Rubber Producers (IISRP), supporting the conclusion that bu-
tadiene exposure was causing cancer among workers at approximately
the rate predicted by extrapolations from the animal data.'8 9 Spurred by
this new confirmation of the seriousness of the butadiene risk, 190 labor
and industry representatives were able to reach agreement on a set of
recommendations which were presented to OSHA on January 29, 1996.'91
OSHA then reopened its rulemaking process to solicit comments on the
recommendations, and the parties to the labor/industry agreement sub-
mitted draft regulatory language that translated their regulations into
182. See Occupational Exposure to 1,3-Butadiene; Proposed Rule and Notice of
Hearing, 55 Fed. Reg. 32,736, 32,804 (1990) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 1910, 1915,
1926) (proposed Aug. 10, 1990) [hereinafter 1,3-Butadiene Proposed Rule].
183. Id.
184. Chuck Gordon et al., Union-Industry Recommendations Give a Big Bounce to
OSHA 's Butadiene Standard, 8 JOB SAFETY & HEALTH Q. 27 (1997).
185. In the preamble to the final butadiene rule, OSHA noted that it "was neither a
party to nor present at the negotiations." 1,3-Butadiene Final Rule, supra note 178, at
56,750.
186. See Wright Interview, supra note 56; see also 1,3-Butadiene Final Rule, supra
note 178, at 56,795 (observing that "many facilities in the affected industries have already
achieved the reductions in employee exposures required by the final rule").
187. See Wright Interview, supra note 56.
188. See id.
189. The results and methodology of this study, conducted by Delzell et al., are dis-
cussed in 1,3-Butadiene Final Rule, supra note 178, at 56,759-61.
190. See Gordon et al., supra note 184, at 27 ("It wasn't until after new data
confirmed the risk of butadiene, in 1995 . . . that these groups began negotiating joint rec-
ommendations on the issues"). This was confirmed with the Steelworkers' Michael Wright.
See Wright Interview, supra note 56.
191. See 1,3-Butadiene Final Rule, supra note 178, at 56,749.
specific requirements.19 2 On November 4, 1996, OSHA issued a final bu-
tadiene standard based largely on the language drafted by the la-
bor/industry negotiators.19 3
As recommended by the negotiators, the revised butadiene standard
sets an eight-hour PEL of 1.0 ppm, an STEL of 5.0 ppm over fifteen
minutes, and an "action level" of 0.5 ppm. If monitoring reveals that the
0.5 ppm action level is being exceeded, the employer must implement an
"exposure goal program" designed to "limit employee exposures to be-
low the action level during normal operations."194 Such a program is to
consist of specified engineering controls (when feasible), worker train-
ing, medical surveillance, and additional monitoring.19 5
OSHA was enthusiastic about the butadiene standard, and about the
role played by the negotiations in developing the standard.
At the signing of the butadiene standard ... [then OSHA Adminis-
trator] Joe Dear remarked how the groundwork laid by the labor-
management agreement gives both a more protective standard and a
strong scientific underpinning for [the] regulation. 'Because the
standard is based on the agreement and supported by both workers
and their employers, we are confident the provisions are practical,
and the protections will be put in place.' 96
Without a doubt, negotiation facilitated OSHA's adoption of the
butadiene standard. It is apparent that the agency deferred both to the
trade-offs and to the timetable of the labor/industry negotiators, and it is
not clear what timetable OSHA would have followed in the absence of
these negotiations. Certainly it is conceivable that, absent some other
form of outside pressure (such as a union lawsuit seeking to force prom-
ulgation), OSHA would not have issued the final standard by 1996.
It is less clear, however, that the negotiated standard is "more pro-
tective" than what OSHA could have produced on its own. After the in-
dustry-funded epidemiologic study confirmed the carcinogenic risk of
butadiene, OSHA was in a strong position to impose a PEL more strin-
gent than the 2.0 ppm standard it had proposed in 1990. OSHA had con-
cluded that a significant risk of cancer existed even at a 0.5 ppm exposure
192. See id. at 56,749-50.
193. See id. at 56,746. In the preamble to the final standard, OSHA stated that the
provisions of the standard "are, in large part, similar to the requirements recommended by
the labor/industry group .... " Id. at 56,798. Indeed, a comparison of the standard with the
language drafted by the labor/industry negotiators demonstrates that, both in substance and
in form, the standard is based largely on the recommendations.
194. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1051(g) (1997).
195. See id. § 1910.1051(h). The specified engineering controls include, among
other efforts, leak prevention, detection, and repair, and the use of pump exposure control
technology.
196. Gordon et al., supra note 184, at 29.
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level,'97 and industry representatives reportedly were concerned that
OSHA would set the PEL at 0.5 ppm. 198 The negotiated compromise, a
PEL of 1.0 ppm and a 0.5 ppm action level, thus appeared palatable in
comparison. Moreover, in return for their agreement to accept these
lower levels, industry representatives were able to secure a compromise
on the use of respirators. The 1990 proposed standard had specified, con-
sistent with OSHA policy, that the exposure limits were to be met largely
through the use of engineering controls and work practices, and it per-
mitted compliance through the use of personal respirators only for those
situations in which the employer could establish that compliance was not
otherwise technologically feasible.199 The negotiated compromise, how-
ever, allows compliance through the use of personal respirators during
intermittent non-routine peak exposures. In deference to the negotiators,
OSHA retained these provisions in the final rule.200
Instead of producing a standard that is clearly stronger than the one
originally proposed by OSHA, then, the negotiations produced a result
that arguably reduces the incentive for meaningful technological change
by industry. For, although a 1.0 ppm PEL is more protective than a 2.0
ppm PEL, the workplace technology that is capable of meeting 2.0 ppm
during routine operation likely will be capable of meeting 1.0 ppm as
well.201 It is achieving these levels during periods of non-routine opera-
tion that poses the greater technological challenge.202 That is why, in the
197. See 1,3-Butadiene Final Rule, supra note 178, at 56,814 ("OSHA has estimated
the lifetime cancer risk from exposure to [butadiene] to be about 4 per 1,000 workers at ...
.0.5ppm ... .").
198. See Wright Interview, supra note 56.
199. See 1,3-Butadiene Proposed Rule, supra note 182, at 32,736, 32,740. OSHA's
standard policy is to require that compliance be achieved through the use of engineering
controls and/or changes in work practices unless the employer can demonstrate that this
would be infeasible. See, e.g., BENJAMIN W. MINTZ, OSHA HISTORY, LAW, AND POLICY 91
(1984). See also 1,3-Butadiene Final Rule, supra note 178, at 56,809 (noting OSHA's
"traditional adherence to [a] hierarchy of controls" that specifies that "engineering controls
and work practices are to be used in preference to respiratory protective equipment").
200. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1051(h)(ii) (1997).
201. The rulemaking record does not suggest that different engineering controls will
be necessary to achieve compliance at 1.0 ppm during routine operation. Rather, the com-
ments submitted to OSHA by the synthetic rubber industry cited "non-routine intermittent
peak exposures" as "the major reason" that industry would find it difficult to meet even a
2.0 ppm standard. In re Proposed Standard for Occupational Exposure to 1,3-Butadiene,
Supplemental Comments for the Reopened Record Submitted by the Int'l Inst. for Syn-
thetic Rubber Producers, Inc., OSHA Docket No. HS-041, at 5 (Apr. 26, 1996) [hereinafter
IISRP Comments]. With the assurance that compliance through the use of respirators
would be permitted during such non-routine exposures, industry representatives were
willing to agree to a 1.0 ppm standard. See id.; see also 1,3-Butadiene Final Rule, supra
note 178 at 56,803 (citing IISRP comments as indicating that the negotiated standard will
be feasible).
202. See IISRP Comments, supra note 201, at 5. According to the IISRP, the expo-
sures for which respirators are allowed "are caused by process equipment leaks, sampling,
and maintenance activities that are extremely difficult to anticipate or to prevent through
traditional engineering controls or work practices." Id. at 2.
words of the IISRP in its comments urging OSHA to adopt the compro-
mise language drafted by the negotiators, "industry needed respirator
flexibility to accept . .. lower [exposure limits]." 20 3 By giving industry
the flexibility it wanted on this point, the negotiated standard secured a
short-term goal: it hastened the implementation of stricter butadiene ex-
posure limits by assuring that industry would not challenge those limits
in court. In the long term, however, the inclusion of such flexibility may
also have removed much of the pressure for further technological im-
provement.204
e. Evaluation
There is perhaps no other regulatory agency whose capacity to spur
technological change is as well-documented as OSHA's. Particularly in
the agency's early years, OSHA's promulgation of toxic substance expo-
sure standards-through the use of traditional rulemaking procedures-
produced technological changes within regulated industries that have
markedly improved the health of U.S. workers.20 The four rulemakings
studied here indicate that, measured against the goal of securing a more
health-protective standard, negotiated rulemaking has not been an im-
provement on the traditional rulemaking process. Indeed, negotiated
rulemaking appears to have served, at least in part, as a means for OSHA
to abdicate its stewardship role under the law.
The formaldehyde and butadiene negotiations, for example, are
noteworthy for the lack of involvement by, or direction from, OSHA. In
both cases, interested parties began the negotiations of their own volition,
some time after the agency had promulgated a proposed standard. The
fact that the parties chose to take these matters into their own hands
should not be particularly surprising. In contrast to the environmental
arena, the key players in the OSHA negotiated rulemakings, industry and
organized labor, have a long history of resolving disputes through nego-
tiation. In a very real sense, negotiation is an important part of their
"culture." Moreover, beginning with the installation of an anti-regulatory
administration in Washington after the election of President Reagan in
1980, OSHA has generally been less aggressive in promoting the cause
203. Id. at 5. The IISRP comments also characterized the respirator provisions as
"[c]rucial to the feasibility of the very low [exposure limits]" and "essential to a workable
standard." Id.
204. The negotiated standard's exposure goal program could provide some incentive
for innovation, however. Because this program could require the installation of specified
control technology if the 0.5 ppm action level is being exceeded, see supra notes 194-195
and accompanying text, it may encourage some employers to look for cheaper, alternative
methods of keeping routine exposures below 0.5 ppm.
205. See, e.g., OTA Report, supra note 167, at 89-95 (summarizing the promulga-
tion and effects of OSHA's vinyl chloride, cotton dust, lead, ethylene oxide, and formalde-
hyde standards).
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of worker health and safety than it was during the first decade of its ex-
istence.2 06 In the absence of an aggressive regulatory body, the unions
have turned both to negotiation and to litigation in an attempt to prod the
regulatory process forward.207
Although the standards that emerged from the formaldehyde and
butadiene negotiations did secure improvements in worker protection, nei-
ther case supports the proposition that private negotiations are more likely to
protect worker health than traditional rulemaking. Rather, these negotia-
tions illustrate that private negotiations can produce results when condi-
tions are right, especially when the regulatory agency fails to seize the
opportunities before it. In both cases, a significant event occurring out-
side the negotiation process (for formaldehyde, the court decision re-
manding the 1.0 ppm standard, and for butadiene, the industry-funded
epidemiologic study confirming a meaningful risk of cancer) gave the
206. For example, from 1972 through 1980, a period of nine years, OSHA promul-
gated 11 toxic substance exposure standards. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910 subpt. Z (1997); see
also DEPARTMENT OF OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH, AFL-CIO, PROMISES KEPT,
PROMISES BROKEN: 25 YEARS OF WORKER SAFETY AND HEALTH IN THE UNITED STATES 69
(1996) (showing dates of promulgation through early 1996) [hereinafter AFL-CIO]. From
1981 through 1998, a period of eighteen years, OSHA has promulgated ten new toxic sub-
stance exposure standards, has repromulgated its benzene standard, has extended its lead
standard to the construction industry, and has updated its asbestos standard. See 29 C.F.R.
§ 1910 subpt. Z (1997); AFL-CIO at 69. Four of the ten new standards were promulgated
during the Reagan administration, and six were promulgated during the Bush and Clinton
administrations. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910 subpt. Z (1997); AFL-CIO at 69. Of these ten new
standards, one (the hazard communication standard) was begun in the Carter administra-
tion, one (the ethylene oxide standard) was promulgated only after OSHA was given a
court order to issue a final rule, see Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Auchter, 702
F.2d 1150 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (per curiam), Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Brock,
823 F.2d 626 (D.C. Cir. 1987), two (the formaldehyde and MDA standards) were referred
to OSHA by EPA under section 9 of TSCA, and, as discussed above, two (the final formal-
dehyde and butadiene standards) were negotiated by industry and labor without the partici-
pation of OSHA. For a discussion of OSHA standard-setting that compares the agency's
technology-forcing approach in the early years with its more tentative approach in the later
years, see ASHFORD & CALDART, supra note 177, at 103-83. See also DAVID P. MCCAF-
FREY, OSHA AND THE POLITICS OF HEALTH REGULATION (1982) (discussing the develop-
ment of OSHA toxic substance standards from 1971 to 1981). McCaffrey notes "the
Reagan administration's extraordinary efforts to reduce occupational health regulation," id.
at xiii, and recounts, as an example, the Reagan OSHA's unsuccessful attempt to undo a
decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia which had upheld the
Carter administration's position that OSHA is not required to perform a cost-benefit analy-
sis before setting occupational health standards. See id. at 173. For a discussion of OSHA
at the end of the Reagan era, see William Glaberson, Is OSHA Falling Down on the Job?,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 1987, at § 3, at 1 (discussing studies critical of OSHA's record of
preventing occupational injury and disease). For an overview and critique of OSHA's more
recent performance, see AFL-CIO, supra (charting trends in occupational illness and dis-
ease, OSHA standard-setting and enforcement, OSHA budget and staffing, and other indi-
cators of OSHA activities from 1970-71 through 1995-96).
207. The formaldehyde and butadiene standards both are examples of labor seizing
the initiative through negotiation. In both cases, the negotiations determined the timetable
for the issuance of the final standard. Examples of labor's use of litigation to compel the
issuance of a rule include the benzene standard, see United Steelworkers of America, AFL-
CIO-CLC, supra note 138, and the ethylene oxide standard, see Auchter, supra note 206.
unions a strong bargaining position from which to achieve consensus on
the negotiated rules. But these same events had also put OSHA in a
strong position to promulgate an equally or more protective standard
through the traditional rulemaking process. Rather than taking advantage
of these opportunities, however, OSHA accepted the policy choices made
by labor and industry negotiators. '
This is nothing new. In 1983, several years before the formaldehyde
negotiations, labor and industry representatives met informally to resolve
outstanding issues regarding OSHA's cotton dust standard. 208 As with the
formaldehyde and butadiene standards, the negotiations began at the in-
stigation of the parties themselves, without the involvement of OSHA,
and after OSHA had issued a proposed standard.20 Further, as with the
formaldehyde standard, the negotiations began following a court ruling
on the OSHA standard. The agency's exposure limit for cotton dust had
been upheld by the Supreme Court, leaving only certain ancillary issues
needing resolution.210 Before it sat down to negotiate with labor, then, the
industry knew that a standard incorporating a particular exposure level
would be implemented, and it thus was highly motivated to negotiate the
process of that implementation. As noted by author Henry Perritt, the
fact that the parties were able to reach an agreement that was adopted by
the agency "illustrates the possibility of negotiated agreement on contro-
versial rules, without agency participation, when the incentives of the
private parties are strong."21
As analysis of the benzene negotiations indicates, however, mean-
ingful results are much less likely when incentives are weak. In contrast
to the formaldehyde, butadiene, and cotton dust negotiations, the benzene
negotiations came at the invitation of OSHA and after industry had
mounted a successful court challenge to the exposure level originally set
by OSHA. The pressure on industry to agree to a protective standard,
then, was far from heavy, and negotiations eventually stalled. It ulti-
mately took the rigors of the rulemaking process, prompted into action
by a union lawsuit, to successfully re-impose the 1.0 ppm standard.
The MDA negotiations, which were initiated by OSHA and which
featured OSHA as a key participant, did produce a final rule, even though
there was no strong incentive driving the parties to reach agreement. This
likely is explained, however, by the minimal stakes involved for indus-
try-relatively few employees were affected and the cost of compliance
was low.
208. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1043 (1997).
209. See Perritt, supra note 120, at 1682-83.
210. See American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1980).
211. Perritt, supra note 120, at 1683 (citation omitted).
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IV. NEGOTIATED IMPLEMENTATION
In contrast to its role in enforcing a regulatory standard, discussed
in Part V, an agency's role in implementing the standard is circumscribed.
Nonetheless, there are circumstances in which the agency may be able to
use negotiation during implementation to encourage innovation and/or
incidental health, safety, or environmental gains.
A. The Environmental Protection Agency
Over its history, EPA has made some use of negotiated implementa-
tion, both within its explicit statutory mandates (using innovation waivers
available under certain environmental statutes) and outside of them (us-
ing its Project XL program).2 2
1. Innovation Waivers
Various U.S. environmental statutes, such as the CAA and the Clean
Water Act ("CWA"), 213 have had provisions allowing EPA to issue inno-
vation waivers to qualifying firms, thus allowing them additional time to
develop innovative approaches to compliance. Under these provisions,
EPA is authorized to extend the deadline by which a firm must meet
emission or effluent limitations, so long as the agency is persuaded that
the firm is actively pursuing an innovative approach to compliance that
shows real promise of coming to fruition. Innovation waivers are meant
to focus squarely on the innovation of new technology, and are not de-
signed to promote diffusion of an existing technology. 214
212. See infra Part IV.A.2.
213. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994).
214. The CAA authorizes a waiver of new source performance standards, for up to
four years after the source begins operation, "to encourage the use of an innovative tech-
nological system or systems of continuous emission reduction." 42 U.S.C. § 411(j)(1)(A),
(j)(1)(E)(ii) (1994). The CWA authorizes a waiver of certain effluent standards for up to
two years, to allow the development of "an innovative production process ... or... inno-
vative control technique" that results in a "significantly greater effluent reduction" than
presently required, or to allow the development of an innovative system that achieves the
effluent limitation presently required and "has the potential for significantly lower costs"
than currently available technology. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(k) (1994). Although the statutory
compliance date for these standards has long since passed, see 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(C),
(D), (E), & (F) (1994) (specifying a compliance date "in no case later than March 31,
1989"), the CWA requires EPA to periodically review and revise these standards, see id.
§ 1311(d), and the agency presumably is authorized to grant innovation waivers for the
revised standards as well. The CWA also authorizes a waiver of pretreatment standards
(governing discharges into a publicly owned treatment works) for up to two years to allow
application of "an innovative system that meets the requirements of section 1311(k)." 33
U.S.C. § 1317(e) (1994). The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA"), 42
U.S.C. §§ 6901-6986. (1994), the major federal statute governing the generation, trans-
port, and disposal of hazardous waste, also has a provision authorizing a form of innova-
Conceptually, the innovation waiver makes a great deal of sense.
Translation of an innovative idea into an operational reality, which often
requires several iterations of trial and error, can take substantial time,
during which a firm might otherwise find itself liable for penalties for
violations of emission or effluent standards. The innovation waiver ex-
empts the firm from such penalties during a designated trial period and
offers it the prospect of the cost savings that may be derived from the
development of a superior technology. Because of the long time generally
required to develop technological innovations, it may be unrealistic to
expect EPA to use innovation waivers to promote radical process innova-
tion. Nonetheless, the agency might well use such waivers to encourage
both incremental process innovation and the acceleration of radical inno-
vation already underway.
In practice, however, innovation waivers have been used sparingly
by EPA, both because industry has been unsure of their application (and
thus has been wary of risking non-compliance), and because the agency
has not encouraged their use.215 Success will require EPA to give early,
clear, and certain signals to the firm, thus minimizing the risk that the
firm's technology may be found unacceptable later. Furthermore, good
faith efforts resulting in significant, though not complete, achievement of
the pollution reduction goal may need to be rewarded by "fail-soft" en-
forcement strategies, such as a reduction of otherwise applicable penal-
ties. In this way, industry might be persuaded to take the technological
and legal risk that the innovation waiver often poses. In this context, one
can make a case for "risk sharing" between government and industry in
the interest of fostering innovative solutions. 6
tion waiver, but it focuses only on remediation technologies. RCRA authorizes EPA to
"issue a research, development, and demonstration permit" for the use of "an innovative
and experimental hazardous waste treatment technology or process .... " 42 U.S.C.
§ 6925(g)(1) (1994). Such a permit may be issued for up to three years, in one-year inter-
vals. See id. § 6925(g)(4). This allows the permittee (either the generator of the waste or a
waste treatment facility) to utilize the technology or process to treat specified types and
quantities of hazardous waste, in order to determine the viability and effectiveness of the
technology or process, even though EPA waste treatment standards might not otherwise be
attained. See id. § 6825(g)(2). EPA may cancel the permit at any time it determines that
such action is "necessary to protect human health and the environment." Id. § 6925(g)(3).
215. For a detailed review of the early EPA experience with innovation waivers that
discusses these points, see Nicholas A. Ashford et al., Using Regulation to Change the
Market for Innovation, 9 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 419, 443-62 (1985). For a more recent
evaluation of the use of innovation waivers under CWA, see OFFICE OF WATER, U.S. EPA,
PROVIDING WAIVERS FROM NPDES PERMIT COMPLIANCE FOR INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION PRE-
VENTION TECHNOLOGY, THE INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION PREVENTION PROJECT (IP3) ANALYSIS
OF SECTIONS 301(K) AND 307(E) OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT (1994).
216. For an indication that EPA has not always taken a flexible approach in similar
situations, see Monsanto Co. v. EPA, 19 F.3d 1201 (7th Cir. 1994). Monsanto had been
granted a nine-month extension to comply with the applicable CAA emission standard for
benzene under section 112(c)(1)(B)(ii) of the act, which at that time (prior to the 1990
CAA Amendments) allowed EPA to grant a waiver for up to two years if it found that
"such period is necessary for the installation of controls and that steps will be taken during
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2. Extra-Statutory Efforts: Project XL
In an effort to add to those opportunities for flexibility that are
specifically authorized by statute, such as innovation waivers, EPA some-
times endeavors to incorporate flexibility into its regulatory implementa-
tion by agency fiat. A recent example is the Clinton EPA's Excellence in
Leadership Project, popularly known as Project XL. The White House
announced this program, with considerable fanfare, in a 1995 policy
statement,2 1 7 and EPA published a set of guidelines for approving Project
XL proposals in 1996.218
The basic idea of Project XL is to allow regulatory flexibility in re-
turn for superior environmental performance at selected facilities on a
facility-by-facility basis. As conceived, the cornerstone on which Project
XL was to rest is negotiation among the regulators, the facility owners,
and the affected community, resulting in a Final Project Agreement
("FPA") governing environmental performance at the facility. The un-
derlying rationale for Project XL is the belief that, for appropriately se-
lected (new and existing) facilities, such negotiations can produce a plan
for limiting pollutant discharge from the facility that will both cost less
and reduce environmental and public health risks more than would have
been the case under existing regulations.2 19 Although the program is still
the period of the waiver to assure that the health of persons will be protected from immi-
nent endangerment." 42 U.S.C. § 7412(c)(1)(B)(ii) (1994). Although this was not an inno-
vation waiver provision, Monsanto had planned to comply with the emission standard us-
ing a method that allowed recovery and reuse of benzene and other organic chemicals, and
it used the waiver period to install and test that system. See Monsanto, supra, at 1203-05.
Monsanto found, however, that the new system was not fully effective in meeting the stan-
dard, and it requested an additional waiver to allow installation of a carbon adsorption
system to capture the residual benzene. See id. at 1203. EPA denied the request, noting that
Monsanto could simply have chosen, at the outset, to fully comply through the installation
a larger carbon adsorption system. See id. at 1205. Monsanto sought review, and the Sev-
enth Circuit Court of Appeals held that EPA's refusal to grant the additional waiver time
was arbitrary and capricious. In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that EPA's im-
plicit preference for the carbon adsorption system (an end-of-the-pipe approach) was in-
consistent with the agency's own pollution prevention policy, see id. at 1206, that the total
waiver time requested by Monsanto was within the two-year time frame contemplated by
the statutory waiver provision, see id. at 1207, and that Monsanto had acted in good faith,
see id. at 1207. The court also stressed that EPA had the discretion under the statute to
adopt a flexible approach that favors pollution prevention: "[I]f a company like Monsanto
has a choice between two control strategies, the EPA has the authority to grant a waiver for
a pollution prevention strategy even if that strategy would take slightly longer to imple-
ment than the less desirable strategy." Id. at 1207.
217. See BILL CLINTON & AL GORE, REINVENTING ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION,
CLINTON ADMINISTRATION REGULATORY REFORM INITIATIVES (1995).
218. See OFFICE OF POLICY, PLANNING AND EVALUATION, US. EPA, PRINCIPLES
FOR DEVELOPMENT OF PROJECT XL FINAL PROJECT AGREEMENTS (1996).
219. Negotiation between the agency and the facility owner (sometimes also in-
volving environmental groups and/or local community groups) is commonplace in the
permitting process. Project XL negotiations are different, however, in that they purport to
replace current standards with an alternative approach, while traditional permit negotia-
tions generally regard the proper way to apply current standards to the facility in question.
in its infancy, it is probably fair to say that it has been far from a clear
success.220 Few FPAs have been negotiated, and some of those that have
are the subject of considerable debate and opposition.221
A fundamental problem with Project XL is that it envisions a kind
of regulatory flexibility that has not been authorized by Congress.2 22 Be-
cause it is not authorized by statute, the regulatory plan set forth in the
negotiated FPA does not supersede existing regulations. 223 Thus, to the
extent that the regulatory "flexibility" negotiated by the participants in-
volves a failure to comply with certain regulations (even if it also in-
volves outperforming certain other regulations), the facility will be oper-
ating in violation of the law. Additionally, since relief from existing
regulations is precisely what makes this program attractive to the busi-
ness community, most FPAs can be expected to involve violations of ap-
plicable environmental regulations. Indeed, one source reports that a cur-
rent expression among EPA staff familiar with Project XL is that "if it
ain't illegal, it ain't XL."224 This makes Project XL an unsafe bet for the
participating firm. Even if EPA and the state give informal assurances
that they will not take enforcement action that is inconsistent with the
FPA, the agencies cannot guarantee that such enforcement action will not
be taken under the "citizen suit" provision of the applicable federal stat-
ute.22 5
In theory, the threat of a citizen enforcement suit was to be eradi-
cated (or at least greatly minimized) by the inclusion of the affected
community in the negotiation process. Yet this points to a second funda-
Thus, XL purports to be the negotiation of environmental policy, albeit on a facility-by-
facility basis.
220. See generally Rena I. Steinzor, Reinventing Environmental Regulation: The
Dangerous Journey from Command to Self-Control, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 103 (1998).
221. EPA Administrator Carol Browner announced on March 30, 1998, that seven
FPAs had been negotiated as of that date, but she committed the agency to having a total of
50 XL projects underway by the end of 1999. See Susan Bruninga, Browner Touts Rein-
vention Progress, Says 50 XL Projects Expected by Late 1999, 28 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2529
(1998).
222. There has been some interest in Congress in passing legislation that would
provide statutory authorization for Project XL agreements. See Bill Would Give EPA More
Authority Over Project XL 28 Env't. Rep. (BNA) 1355 (1997).
223. Absent statutory authority to do so, an agency cannot insulate a regulated en-
tity from the need to comply with relevant legal requirements. See, e.g., Delaney v. EPA,
898 F.2d 687, 691 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied 498 U.S. 998 (1990) (holding that EPA may
not extend the statutory deadline by which a state must meet ambient air quality standards
under the CAA).
224. JAN MAZUREK, MAKING MICROCHIPS: POLICY, GLOBALIZATION, AND ECO-
NOMIC RESTRUCTURING IN THE SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY 171 (forthcoming 1999) (on
file with authors).
225. Most federal environmental statutes, including CAA, CWA, and RCRA, have
provisions that afford persons who are harmed by violations of the statute a right to en-
force the law against the violator in federal court, and to seek injunctive relief (to secure
compliance), civil penalties, and attorneys' fees, in situations where the agencies have
failed to diligently enforce the law. See 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1994) (CAA); 33 U.S.C. § 1365
(1994) (CWA); 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1994) (RCRA).
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mental problem with XL: the difficulty of defining the relevant "commu-
nity." Is it limited to those living near the plant, or does it include na-
tional and regional environmental groups with an interest in the issue?
Does it include labor? Does it include those who speak on behalf of the
protection of sensitive populations, or on behalf of disadvantaged neigh-
borhoods? These are high-stakes issues for two reasons.
First, any interested party who is excluded from the negotiation pro-
cess is less likely to be satisfied with the result, and thus is more likely to
challenge it, through a citizen enforcement suit, a public organizing and
publicity campaign, or both. Probably the best-known Project XL agree-
ment to date, for example, pertains to Intel Corporation's newest semi-
conductor production site in Chandler, Arizona. The five-year project
agreement, which covers operations at a 720-acre site, was negotiated
among the company, federal and state regulators, and five Chandler resi-
dents.226 Although the participants presumably are satisfied with the FPA
negotiated through this process, many non-participants are not. Two vo-
ciferous critics have been the Silicon Valley Toxics Coalition, a Califor-
nia-based group that addresses pollution problems in the semiconductor
industry, and the Natural Resources Defense Council ("NRDC"), a na-
tional environmental group. These two groups, which are concerned about
the national and industry-wide implications of this agreement as much as, if
not more than, its local environmental impacts, have mounted a high-
profile campaign against the Intel agreement, and against Project XL it-
self.227 This level of opposition clearly indicates that the negotiating
committee that devised the regulatory plan for the Intel facility was not
representative of the "relevant" community.
Second, the composition of the negotiating committee is of obvious
substantive importance as well. If important constituencies are inade-
quately represented, the agreement negotiated is much less likely to be
the "right" result. The five community representatives who helped nego-
tiate the Intel agreement were also members of a pre-existing Intel
Community Advisory Panel, and were generally representative of a
community sentiment that values the important role that Intel has played
over the past sixteen years in helping transform Chandler from a small
agrarian town into the third fastest-growing city in the United States.228
While this obviously is a legitimate perspective, it may well not be the
one that places environmental and public health protection (much less the
226. See MAZUREK, supra note 224, at 176.
227. An undated flyer circulated by the Silicon Valley Toxics Coalition to environ-
mental activists throughout the country in 1996 states that "'Project XL' translates to
'EXtra Lenient' De-regulation." Silicon Valley Toxics Coalition, Coalition of Community,
Environmental/Justice, and Labor Organizations Blast Clinton Administration "Sweetheart
Deal" with Intel 1 (Nov. 1996) (unpublished pamphlet, on file with the Harvard Environ-
mental Law Review).
228. See MAZUREK, supra note 224, at 167, 188.
health concerns of particularly sensitive populations) at the forefront.
Indeed, the tendency of local groups to sacrifice long-term environmental
and public health interests in favor of short-term economic gain was one
of the factors that drove Congress to begin setting national pollution
standards in the 1970s.229
One of the beliefs underlying Project XL is that sufficient public in-
volvement and scrutiny at a site can greatly diminish the need for a na-
tional regulatory presence. This is unlikely to be the case, however, un-
less the "public" is broadly and fairly represented, and unless its "in-
volvement" is truly meaningful. At the Intel site, it is not at all clear that
the regulatory flexibility negotiated by Intel, such as relaxed permitting
requirements for new product lines, is offset by "superior" environmental
performance. While EPA concluded that the Intel plant will outperform
certain regulatory requirements,230 there appears to have been no showing
that the facility will attain, much less outperform, the current state of the
art for the semiconductor industry. For example, based on a comparison
of projected hazardous air emissions from the new Intel facility to re-
ported emissions from similarly sized semiconductor facilities from 1992
through 1994, EPA concluded that "Intel is well within, if not exceeding,
the standard for the industry .... 23
Had groups such as the Silicon Valley Toxics Coalition and the
NRDC been involved as full-fledged negotiating participants at the
Intel site, it is likely that any resultant FPA would have been sub-
stantively different from the one actually negotiated. It is question-
able, however, whether Intel would have agreed to negotiate a FPA
with such groups participating. Indeed, when these and other envi-
ronmental groups requested that the Intel agreement be augmented
with legally enforceable pollution prevention requirements, Intel
was not receptive. "In a column in the 28 June 1996 Washington
Post, Timothy Mohin, Intel's government affairs manager, asked in-
229. See, e.g., RICHARD B. STEWART & JAMES E. KRIER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND
POLICY 336-40 (1978) (discussing the rationale for setting national air quality standards).
But see Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Commerce: Rethinking the "Race-to-
the-Bottom" Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210
(1992).
230. See OFFICE OF POLICY, PLANNING AND EVALUATION, U.S. EPA, RESPONSE TO
COMMENTS ON INTEL'S FINAL PROJECT AGREEMENT 9-11 (1996).
231. Id. at 14. EPA went on to note, however, that Intel's commitment to comply
with the Arizona Ambient Quality Guidelines for hazardous air pollutants, and to use con-
servative modeling assumptions in assessing compliance with these guidelines, "certainly
provides a superior benefit." Id. at 14. This commitment appears to have been a tradeoff
for Intel's having an aggregate emissions limit for hazardous air pollutants, instead of a
specific emission limit for each such pollutant. See id. at 12.
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credulously: 'Citizens are going to make decisions ... that are
binding on Fortune 500 Companies?"'232
Although this clearly does not represent the sentiments of all companies
regarding all situations, the hesitancy that many firms would feel about
participating in site-specific negotiations in which environmental groups
were accorded equal status is another factor that would tend to limit the
success of an initiative such as Project XL. In addition, meaningful in-
volvement of the public, even where it is acceptable to the company,
likely would extend considerably the time necessary to develop the FPA.
EPA's more recent statements indicate that the agency's enthusiasm
for Project XL has been tempered. 233 Although it is not abandoning the
XL initiative, EPA appears to have recognized that the site-specific nego-
tiated solution is fraught with potential problems, and that, like negoti-
ated rulemaking, it cannot be expected to be successful without a sub-
stantial commitment of time and resources. 234 A Project XL success story
makes the point. In 1997, the agency completed negotiations on what has
been characterized as a "small, focused" FPA involving an OSi Special-
ties organo-silicone plant on the Ohio River.235 According to James A.
Nortz, Senior Attorney for Witco Corporation (parent company of OSi
Specialties), who participated in the process, the negotiations were
"enormously burdensome" for the agency.236 "Unless they can think of a
more efficient way to do it," he opined, "I'd be surprised if the program
survives."237 To some degree, of course, the amount of time and resources
that the agency currently devotes to a Project XL negotiation is a func-
tion of the relative novelty of the XL concept within EPA, the level of
mistrust of the XL process within the environmental community, and the
pressure on the agency to "make good" on its promise to deliver in-
creased regulatory flexibility without sacrificing environmental goals.
Even if Project XL were to one day become a routinized part of EPA's
activities, however, one would expect the resource demand to continue to
be substantial. Real negotiation of environmental policy, even if it is only
the policy for a single facility, requires considerable effort.
232. Mazurek supra note 224, at 187 (quoting Cindy Skrzycki, Some State Envi-
ronmental Chiefs Want EPA Off the Stage, WASH. POST, June 20, 1997, at G1).
233. See U.S. EPA, NEW DIRECTIONS: A REPORT ON REGULATORY REINVENTION 1-
2 (1997).
234. See id., at 1-2. However, EPA hopes to have 50 FPAs in place by late 1999. See
Bruninga, supra note 221, at 2529.
235. See David J. Hanson, An XL Project Goes Smoothly, CHEM. & ENGINEERING
NEWS, Dec. 8, 1997, at 18. The parties signed the FPA in October 1997, and EPA pub-
lished a draft final rule implementing the agreement in March 1998. See Project XL Accord
Gives Regulatory Relief to Specialty Chemicals Plant in West Virginia, 12 Toxics L. Rep.
(BNA) 1194-95 (1998).
236. Hanson, supra note 235, at 19.
237. Id.
B. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration
Although the OSHAct gives OSHA a certain amount of discretion as
to the manner in which it implements an occupational safety and health
standard once the standard has been promulgated, the agency has been
slow to use this discretion as a means of encouraging innovative techno-
logical change. Under specified circumstances, OSHA is authorized to
grant either a temporary or permanent variance from an OSHAct stan-
dard.238 Requests for variances, which are to be submitted and evaluated
on an employer-by-employer basis, necessarily provide an opportunity
for negotiations between the agency, the individual employers, and the
affected employees. 239 Negotiations may cover the length, extent, and
conditions of the variance.
Of particular interest is OSHA's authority under section 6 of the
OSHAct to grant a variance from an occupational safety and health stan-
dard "whenever [the agency] determines that such variance is necessary
to permit an employer to participate in an experiment approved by
[OSHA] ... designed to demonstrate or validate new and improved tech-
niques to safeguard the health or safety of workers."240 This broadly
worded provision would appear to give the agency considerable discre-
tion to give extended compliance time to employers who are endeavoring
in good faith to perfect promising innovative technologies. Properly util-
ized and promoted by OSHA, this "experimental" variance provision
could be a means of encouraging employers to commit resources to the
development of cleaner, safer, and cost-effective workplace technology. It
could also be used to promote industry-labor cooperation on technologi-
cal change in the workplace. To date, however, the agency has largely
ignored the opportunities that this provision of the Act affords.
238. See 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(6)(A) (authorizing the grant of a temporary variance
because of short-term unavailability of personnel or technology necessary to comply with
the standard), 655(b)(6)(C) (authorizing the grant of an "experimental" variance to allow
use of new and improved techniques), and 655(d) (1994) (authorizing the grant of a per-
manent variance as long as the employer adopts alternative means that "will provide em-
ployment and places of employment ... which are as safe and healthful as those which
would prevail if [the employer] complied with the standard").
239. The OSHAct mandates that employees be given an opportunity to participate
when the employer requests a temporary or permanent variance. See 29 U.S.C.
§§ 655(b)(6)(a) (specifying that a temporary variance "may be granted only after notice to
employees and an opportunity for a hearing") & 655(d) (provindg that, after a request for
permanent variance is received, "[a]ffected employees shall be given notice of such appli-
cation and an opportunity to participate in a hearing") (1994). However, the process for
granting an "experimental variance" is less formalized. OSHA is not required to provide an
opportunity for a hearing, see 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(6)(c) (1994), and more discretion is
given to the agency. As a practical matter, however, it is unlikely that OSHA could make a
meaningful determination about the health and safety potential of a new worksplace tech-
nology without involving workers in the process, and it would certainly appear to be within
the agency's discretion to require that they be involved in the discussion regarding a re-
quested variance.
240. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(6)(C) (1994).
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V. NEGOTIATED COMPLIANCE
Roughly ninety percent of firms cited with noncriminal violations of
federal environmental statutes in the United States resolve the matter
through a negotiated settlement (rather than through an administrative
hearing or court trial),241 and the majority of OSHAct citations are re-
solved through settlement as well.242 The settlement of an enforcement
action often offers an agency an excellent opportunity to promote pollu-
tion prevention, rather than conventional end-of-pipe control technology.
The firm's attention has been commanded, and a need for creative (and
less costly) approaches to compliance may well have become apparent.
Outside of the enforcement process, an agency has little statutory or
regulatory authority to require firms to implement pollution prevention;
the regulated community generally can choose the means by which it will
comply with federal requirements. But once an enforcement action is
initiated, a window of opportunity for pollution prevention opens, be-
cause the means of achieving compliance likely will be subject to nego-
tiation between the agency and the violator.
A. The Environmental Protection Agency's Supplemental Environmental
Project ("SEP") Program
EPA has sought to capitalize on this opportunity by encouraging the
use of Supplemental Environmental Projects ("SEP"s) to promote pollu-
tion prevention. SEPs are environmentally beneficial activities that the
violator agrees to perform and/or fund as part of its settlement with EPA,
and that the violator is not otherwise legally required to perform.243 In the
settlement process, EPA and company attorneys typically agree both on a
penalty and on a set of activities designed to achieve and maintain com-
pliance. In 1991, EPA adopted a SEP policy authorizing agency enforce-
ment personnel to reduce the amount of the penalty in exchange for the
execution of a SEP.244 Encouraged by initial results from this approach,
241. See OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE, U.S. EPA, NATIONAL PEN-
ALTY REPORT, OVERVIEW OF EPA FEDERAL PENALTY PRACTICES, FY 1992 (1993).
242. In 1984, former OSHA lawyer Benjamin Mintz reported that approximately
90% of the cases taken to the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (an
adjudicatory body that reviews appeals of OSHA citations) were settled. See MINTZ, supra
note 199, at 484 n.10; see also GARY Z. NOTHSTEIN, THE LAW OF OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY
AND HEALTH 496 (1981) ("The large majority of the cases in which a notice of contest is
filed by an employer are settled."); MARK A. ROTHSTEIN, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND
HEALTH LAW 378 (1978) ("[A]bout 60 percent of all contested cases are disposed of with-
out a hearing ... ").
243. See EPA Supplemental Environmental Projects Policy, 29 Env't Rep. (BNA)
78-79 (1998) [hereinafter 1998 SEP Policy].
244. See Policy on the Use of Supplemental Environmental Projects in EPA Settle-
the agency has revised and expanded its SEP policy since that time.245
The key to the SEP policy is the tradeoff between penalties and
SEPs. Current EPA penalty policy anticipates that, unless the SEP policy
is invoked, the penalty assessed in any enforcement action will be the
sum of (a) the amount of the economic benefit gained by the violator as a
result of non-compliance (typically, the investment earnings from de-
layed capital expenditures, together with any avoided operation and
maintenance costs), and (b) a gravity component (calculated according to
agency guidelines) that is meant to reflect the relative seriousness of the
violations.246 Under the present SEP policy, SEPs may be used to reduce
this amount, so long as the final penalty paid is at least as large as what
EPA characterizes as the minimum penalty: the greater of "(a) the eco-
nomic benefit of non-compliance plus 10 percent of the gravity compo-
nent or (b) 25 percent of the gravity component." 247
Currently, there are seven categories of acceptable SEPs: public
health, pollution prevention, pollution reduction, environmental restora-
tion and protection, assessments and audits, environmental compliance
promotion, and emergency planning and preparedness. 248 The key feature
linking these various categories is the expectation that the project will
result in some benefit to the environment or public health. Some SEPs,
such as an off-site stream restoration project, offer direct, predictable
public benefits while returning no direct benefit to the violator. Others,
such as an agreement by the violator to conduct a comprehensive envi-
ronmental audit of its facility, offer potential (and far less predictable)
benefits both to the public and to the violator. In general, pollution pre-
vention SEPs, which involve expenditures by the violator to implement
technology or practices that reduce its generation of pollution, offer the
greatest potential for the development of innovative production technolo-
gies and practices with widespread application.
ments, 25 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 35,607 (1991).
245. The most recent version became effective on May 1, 1998. See supra note 243.
246. The calculation process is explained in Peter Rosenberg et al., EPA's Revised
SEP Policy and the Negotiation of P2 SEPs, POLLUTION PREVENTION REV., Autumn 1995,
at 1, 4-5, which is a discussion of the workings of the SEP policy (with an emphasis on
pollution prevention) written by EPA personnel. See also 1998 SEP Policy, supra note 243,
at 83-85. It should be noted, however, that it is the experience of the authors of this Article
that, in practice, even when no SEP is involved, the actual penalty number negotiated be-
tween EPA and the violator often is less than the sum of these two factors.
247. 1998 SEP Policy, supra note 243, at 83. A smaller minimum amount may be
allowed for a municipality. See id. at n.13.
248. These seven categories were articulated in the 1995 revisions to the SEP Pol-
icy, see Rosenberg et al., supra note 246, at 2-3, and were retained in the 1998 version, see
1998 SEP Policy, supra note 243, at 80-82. In addition, the 1998 version adds a non-
specific eighth category entitled "Other Types of Projects," which is meant to encompass
those projects which may not fit under any one of the seven specified categories but which
nonetheless may be acceptable as SEPs. See 1998 SEP Policy, supra note 243, at 82. Any
such project "may be accepted with the advance approval of the [EPA's] Office of En-
forcement and Compliance Assurance." Id.
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So long as the penalty does not fall below the acceptable minimum,
EPA will (depending on the assessed merits of the project) credit up to
eighty percent of the after-tax cost of most approved SEPs (net of any
savings, such as reduced operations costs, that the SEP may offer to the
violator) against the amount of the penalty.249 In order to encourage cer-
tain types of projects, however, the agency revised its policy in 1995 to
offer a credit of up to 100% for SEPs judged to be "of outstanding qual-
ity" according to a set of specified criteria.250 Two of the six criteria
specified in the most recent version of the SEP policy are: (a) the extent
to which the project develops or implements pollution prevention tech-
niques or practices; and (b) the extent to which the project develops or
implements innovative technological approaches. 251
EPA reports that, between Fiscal Years 1992 and 1994, it negotiated
more than 700 SEPs.252 Of these, approximately fourteen percent were
pollution prevention SEPs, with an estimated total value of approxi-
mately $57 million.253 EPA estimates that these pollution prevention SEPs
will reduce the discharge of toxic chemicals and the production of haz-
ardous waste by a total of some 65 million pounds.254
A case study analysis of ten pollution prevention SEPs negotiated
by EPA through Fiscal Year 1992, selected because they reflect a range of
noteworthy technological responses in several EPA regions, found that
the technologies utilized included chemical substitution, process change,
and closed-loop recycling.255 Representatives from nine of the ten firms
249. See 1998 SEP Policy, supra note 243, at 84; see also Rosenberg et al., supra
note 246, at 4-5.
250. Five criteria were specified in the 1995 policy: (1) benefits to the public or en-
vironment at large; (2) pollution prevention; (3) innovativeness; (4) environmental justice;
and (5) multimedia impacts. See Rosenberg et al., supra note 246, at 5. In 1998, a sixth
criterion, community input, was added. See 1998 SEP Policy, supra note 243, at 84.
251. See 1998 SEP Policy, supra note 243, at 84.
252. See Rosenberg et al., supra note 246, at 2.
253. See id. Although the percentage of pollution prevention SEPs may seem small,
that percentage probably (at least) doubles if one excludes the SEPs negotiated by EPA's
Office of Mobile Sources, which, because of the nature of the regulated community, are not
likely to involve pollution prevention SEPs. In Fiscal Year 1992, for example, EPA negoti-
ated 409 SEPs, and 187 of these were negotiated by EPA's Office of Mobile Sources. If
one looks only at the 222 SEPs that were not mobile sources SEPs, the percentage of pol-
lution prevention SEPs for that year was 28%. See Monica Becker & Nicholas Ashford,
Exploiting Opportunities for Pollution Prevention in EPA Enforcement Agreements,
ENVTL. SCI. & TECH., May 1995, 220A, 221A.
254. See Rosenberg et al., supra note 246, at 8 n.3.
255. See Becker & Ashford, supra note 253, at 222A. One of the settlements did not
involve a SEP per se, but rather was an enforcement settlement that used pollution preven-
tion as the compliance method. See id. at 221A. Of the 10 settlements studied, 5 involved
reporting violations under section 313 of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-
to-Know Act ("EPCRA") (Form R, Toxics Release Inventory data reporting), 2 stemmed
from CWA violations, 1 from a CAA violation, and 1 from a RCRA violation. The pre-
dominance in the study sample of EPCRA cases involving failure to report toxic emissions
on a Form R reflects the relatively large number of EPCRA 313 settlements in the larger
sample population. See id. at 222A.
involved expressed support for the SEP policy. 256 They indicated that they
were glad to have had the option to implement a pollution prevention
project in exchange for some penalty reduction, and noted their belief
that the SEPs took some of the "sting" out of the enforcement process
without eliminating the significant economic and psychological impacts
of the enforcement action.2 57 Several company representatives also stated
that the SEP process helped their firm to recognize other opportunities
for environmentally beneficial improvements. 258
The technological changes undertaken by firms through pollution
prevention projects can be categorized according to the locus of the
change and according to the degree of innovation. The majority of tech-
nological changes made by the SEP case study firms were diffusion-
driven.259 There were also some incremental innovations, but only one
case involved a major innovation.260 Technological changes were quite
evenly distributed across the spectrum of primary, secondary, and ancil-
lary processes. 26 ' If a random case-study selection process had been used,
the sample would have been more heavily weighted toward diffusion-
driven changes to ancillary production processes.262 The larger universe
of EPA settlements containing pollution prevention consisted mainly of
the adoption of off-the-shelf technologies.263 This suggests there are un-
exploited opportunities in enforcement for stimulating innovative tech-
nological change. Realization of this potential likely would require
changes in attitudes and knowledge levels, both within industry and
within EPA. One move in this direction has been the agency's more re-
cent willingness to allow up to two years for the completion of selected
256. See id. at 226A.
257. See id.
258. See U.S. EPA, RECENT EXPERIENCES IN ENCOURAGING THE USE OF POLLU-
TION PREVENTION IN ENFORCEMENT SETTLEMENTS, FINAL REPORT IV-37 to IV-39 (1995).
259. See Becker & Ashford, supra note 253, at 224A.
260. See id.
261. See id. The distinction between primary, secondary, and ancillary manufactur-
ing and production processes is an important one for innovation. An example in the context
of casting and plating metal screws makes the point. The primary process is the casting of
the screw. The secondary process is electroplating. The ancillary process is cleaning or
degreasing the screw using organic solvents. If the latter activity creates the environmental
problems facing the firm, it might be relatively easy for the firm to search for and find an
alternative, non-polluting cleaning process, and no innovation would be required. If it is
the electroplating process that needs to be modified, the firm may have to adapt a new
process, such as an alternative plating technology that has been used successfully at other
facilities. There miay be resistance to this change, as the firm might well be uncomfortable
about discarding a proven method, and taking a chance on altering the appearance of its
product. The most resistance could be expected to be generated in response to a need to
change the primary process. Here innovation might be necessary, and the firm would not be
likely to invest in developing an entirely new casting process merely to reduce a penalty.
262. See Becker & Ashford, supra note 253, at 224A.
263. See id.
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pollution prevention SEPs,264 as a longer-term time window is essential if
more significant innovation is to take place.
B. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration
Although OSHA has made a programmatic effort to encourage a co-
operative approach to enforcement at certain worksites,26 5 it has not taken
full creative advantage of the opportunities for negotiation that naturally
occur in enforcement situations. As with negotiated implementation,
there is much that the agency could do here to encourage advances in
workplace practices and technology. For example, rather than simply is-
suing a citation and imposing a fine for a violation, OSHA could use the
enforcement process to create incentives for employers to design and im-
plement both pollution prevention programs and "inherent safety" pro-
grams to reduce the potential for chemical accidents.266 While the devel-
opment of any such initiatives by OSHA must maintain a disincentive to
violate, there is no reason why flexibility in enforcement need be incom-
patible with the integrity of enforcement. OSHA's existing cooperative
compliance programs might provide a framework on which initiatives of
this nature could be built. Moreover, OSHA could draw from, and per-
haps improve on, EPA's extensive experience with SEPs. 267
264. See Rosenberg et al., supra note 246, at 9 n. 13 (noting that "[a]s a general rule,
both sides prefer SEPs that can be completed within two years"). In contrast, it is the un-
derstanding of the authors of this Article that, at the time the case study was conducted, it
was the general policy within the agency that SEPs were to be completed within one year.
265. See, e.g., OSHA Primary Inspection Targeting and Cooperative Compliance
Programs (CCPs), OSHA CCP Concept Paper (June 24, 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review). Under these cooperative compliance
programs, OSHA selects certain employers and offers them "a choice between a coopera-
tive interaction with OSHA or traditional enforcement." Id. at 1. If the employers choosing
the cooperative approach "work cooperatively with OSHA to identify and correct work-
place hazards, reduce their illness and injury rates, and implement a safety and health pro-
gram," they are given compliance assistance and reduced inspections. Id. See also John
Mendeloff, A Preliminary Evaluation of the "Top 200" Program in Maine, Report to the
Office of Statistics, OSHA, U.S. Dept. of Labor 1 (Mar. 1996) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review) (describing an OSHA program in the
State of Maine that "tries to enlist firms in a collaborative effort to introduce or improve
comprehensive safety and health programs").
266. See, e.g., ASHFORD & CALDART, supra note 177, at 522-24 (discussing the pri-
mary accident prevention-"inherent safety"-approach and comparing it with pollution
prevention).
267. It should be noted that, while EPA has been specifically directed to place a
programmatic emphasis on pollution prevention, see Pollution Prevention Act, supra note
100, OSHA has been given no similarly specific congressional mandate. Without question,
however, a programmatic emphasis on pollution prevention, emphasizing those approaches
(such as chemical input substitution and good housekeeping practices) that help to reduce
worker exposures, would be consistent with the OSHAct's general mandate "to assure so
far as possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working
conditions .... " 29 U.S.C. § 51(b) (1994). Further, OSHA, like EPA, has been given a
specific directive to place a programmatic emphasis on chemical accident prevention. See
VI. REGULATORY REINVENTION: EPA'S "COMMON SENSE" INITIATIVE
Under the Clinton Administration, EPA has determined that funda-
mental changes in approach will be necessary if significant additional
progress in protecting the environment is to be made, and if the environ-
mental challenges of the future are to be resolved satisfactorily. The
agency refers to this as the need for "regulatory reinvention." 268 In July
1994, EPA began its Common Sense Initiative ("CSI"), which it has
termed the "centerpiece" of its regulatory reinvention efforts. 269 The pri-
mary goals of CSI are to find "cleaner, cheaper, smarter" ways of reduc-
ing pollution, and to formulate proposed changes in the existing regula-
tory structure to effectuate them. 270 As with Project XL, negotiation
among interested parties is the means by which EPA hopes to achieve the
goals of the program. Unlike Project XL, however, the focus of the nego-
tiations is industry-wide. To carry out CSI, the agency has assembled six
advisory committees, one for each of six industrial sectors: automobile
manufacturing, computers and electronics, iron and steel, metal finishing,
petroleum refining, and printing. 2 7' Each advisory committee consists of
representatives from EPA, the relevant industry sector, state and local
regulatory agencies, national and local environmental groups, labor, and
community organizations. 27 2 The work of these committees is overseen by
a separate council, whose membership is drawn from the same sources.27 3
The council is chaired by the EPA Administrator, and each of the six
sector committees is chaired by an EPA official.274 The work of the coun-
cil and the committees is assisted by EPA staff. 275
This industry-sector structure is based on a fundamentally sound
premise: that, for a variety of reasons, different industries often differ in
their technological and economic potential for reducing pollution, and
also in the way in which they respond to various types of regulatory sig-
42 U.S.C. § 7412(r) (1994) (CAA provision governing accidental releases of hazardous
chemicals); see also ASHFORD & CALDART, supra note 177, at 524-28 (discussing respon-
sibilities and authorities of OSHA and EPA under this CAA provision).
268. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REGULATORY REINVENTION: EPA's
COMMON SENSE INITIATIVE NEEDS AN IMPROVED OPERATING FRAMEWORK AND PROGRESS
MEASURES 4 (1997) [hereinafter GAO REPORT]. Project XL is also considered by EPA to
be part of this regulatory reinvention program. As discussed in Part IV.A.2 above, however,
the focus of XL is not on reinventing the regulations themselves, but rather on affording
increased flexibility in the implementation of the regulations with regard to particular fa-
cilities. The CSI, discussed here, is a much more broad-based, and potentially much more
far-reaching, approach.
269. See id. at 4.
270. See id. at 12-13.
271. See id. at 13.
272. See id. at 13-14.
273. See id.
274. See id.
275. See id. at 14. The council and committees are organized under, and are subject
to, FACA, see supra note 8.
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nals. By bringing together people who are knowledgeable about the op-
portunities for reducing pollution within a particular industry, and who
have a stake in how, when, and under what terms that reduction will oc-
cur, EPA hoped to harness the potential of each industry to a fuller extent
than it had heretofore been able to do. The agency also hoped that, by
creating an atmosphere in which innovation and flexibility were empha-
sized, the focus of the committees would be on pollution prevention
rather than end-of-pipe pollution control.276 If the CSI approach proved to
be a success, EPA also hoped to expand the initiative to other industry
segments in the future.277
Thus far, the results of the CSI experiment have been mixed. On the
one hand, as EPA points out, the initiative has brought together six
groups of people representing a diverse set of interests and has encour-
aged an ongoing dialogue on issues that are important to the future de-
velopment of environmental policy. As summarized by EPA:
In that regard a very significant, but non-quantifiable, accomplish-
ment of CSI has been reducing barriers between formerly adver-
sarial parties. A major success of CSI has been getting the parties to
the table, getting them to agree to talk, getting them, in fact, to en-
gage in substantive discussions on issues in a mutually respectful
manner, and having the parties willingly agree to continue to invest
their own time and energy to maintain and enhance the discus-
sions.278
This is a valid point. If CSI succeeds at nothing more than promoting a
better understanding of the issues, and of each other, among those likely
to participate in environmental policy-making and implementation af-
fecting these industries, it arguably will have had a positive impact.
On the other hand, however, CSI has been criticized for its lack of
substantive results. A series of reviews of CSI have raised this issue, in-
cluding a 1997 report issued by the U.S. General Accounting Office
("GAO"), a research arm of Congress.279 One of GAO's primary conclu-
sions is that
276. See OFFICE OF THE ADM'R, U.S. EPA, COMMON SENSE INITIATIVE: ADMINIS-
TRATOR'S UPDATE 1 (1994).
277. See id.
278. Letter from J. Charles Fox, Assoc. Adm'r, Office of Reinvention, U.S. EPA, to
Peter F. Guerrero, U.S. Gen. Accounting Office (Jul. 3, 1997), reprinted in GAO REPORT,
supra note 268, at 47.
279. See GAO REPORT, supra note 268; see also THE SCIENTIFIC CONSULTING
GROUP, INC., REVIEW OF THE COMMON SENSE INITIATIVE, (1997) (an outside review
commissioned by EPA); HOUSE COMM. ON TRANSP. AND INFRASTRUCTURE, U.S. CON-
GRESS, AN ASSESSMENT OF EPA's REINVENTION (1996); J. CLARENCE DAVIES & JAN MA-
ZUREK, INDUSTRY INCENTIVES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT: EVALUATION OF U.S.
FEDERAL INITIATIVES (1996); OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. EPA, EPA FACA COMMIT-
TEES' COST INCREASE (1996).
[i]n the almost three years the Initiative has been under way, it has
produced three formal recommendations to EPA, none of which has
suggested the types of changes in the existing approach to environ-
mental management that EPA expected.280
In general, GAO and other reviewers have found that the CSI process
moves considerably more slowly than many of the participants would
like.281 The reasons for CSI's slow pace, GAO found, have been mani-
fold: the time necessary to collect and analyze data; the variations in the
participants' understanding of the technical issues involved; the time
taken by the participants "in reaching consensus on the approaches
needed to address large, complex issues or policies"; the time taken by
participants "discussing how they would carry out their work and devel-
oping their own operating standards;" and the difficulties experienced by
some participants in making the necessary time commitment.282 None of
this should be particularly surprising. Indeed, when one adds to this list
the overall need to establish a degree of trust among the participants in
each sector group sufficient to permit a meaningful discussion on sub-
stantive issues, it is not difficult to understand why substantive progress
has been slow in coming. Indeed, the fact that the Initiative is still mov-
ing forward is itself a measure of progress of some import.
Nonetheless, there appears to be a growing feeling among partici-
pants that a failure to increase the pace of substantive progress meaning-
fully in the near future could be the death-knell of the Initiative.28 3 The
automobile and petroleum refining industries have ended their participa-
tion, and other participants have indicated that they will leave unless EPA
makes changes which yield a more efficient process.284 To address this
issue, GAO has proposed that EPA
provide an improved operating framework that (1) more clearly defines
the Initiative's "cleaner, cheaper, smarter" environmental protection
goal-including its expected results-and (2) specifies how the
Council and its subcommittees and workgroups will accomplish
their work, clarifying issues such as how and when consensus will
be achieved, how the Initiative's goal should be interpreted and ap-
plied to individual projects, and to what extent representatives of all
280. GAO REPORT, supra note 268, at 5.
281. See, e.g., Vincent LeClair, 'Common Sense' Reform Initiative Falters, 13
ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. NEWS 222A (1997).
282. GAO REPORT, supra note 268, at 5. For a detailed discussion of these factors,
see id. at 19-25.
283. See LeClair, supra note 281.
284. See id.; see also GAO REPORT, supra note 268, at 25-26. In addition, "several
environmental-justice groups and all the representatives from the state of Michigan" have
withdrawn from the CSI negotiations. Mazurek, supra note 224, at 156.
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stakeholder groups should be included in activities at each level of
the Initiative, including its projects and workgroups.2 85
EPA has indicated that it will introduce reforms of this nature,2 86 but
GAO faults the agency for not having done much of this at the outset. It
is not at all clear, however, that this would have been the right approach.
It is arguable that, had EPA attempted to dictate terms of this nature to
the participants at the beginning of the process, rather than allowing the
participants to first address these issues on their own, it would have en-
gendered considerable resentment among some of the participants. Now,
armed with numerous meetings' worth of information from the partici-
pants as to their thinking on these issues-what is generally agreed to
work well and be appropriate, what is generally agreed to work poorly
and/or not be appropriate, and what areas will require judicious further
definition from the agency-EPA is in a position to help create a better
framework to help guide these (wholly voluntary) participants.
Moreover, the changes envisioned by GAO are unlikelyws address
the more deep-seated issues that have slowed or prevented substantive
results along the lines originally anticipated by EPA. It is likely that a
major factor inhibiting real progress is the fact that, in contrast to negoti-
ated rulemaking, the CSI negotiations are not proceeding within a formal
legal context, with a known and meaningful set of potential conse-
quences. In negotiated rulemaking, the participants all know that, re-
gardless of whether they reach agreement on a proposed rule, a rule is
likely to be issued eventually. The "stakes" for the participants thus are
fairly clear; if they do not negotiate, the agency likely will promulgate a
regulation without them, and the result may be something they will not
like. In the CSI negotiations, however, the consequences of inaction are
likely to be both far less clear and far less dramatic. Indeed, in most
cases, the failure of a negotiating committee to agree on a particular
"regulatory reinvention" proposal will have no greater practical effect
than simply the preservation of the status quo.2 8 7
285. GAO REPORT, supra note 268, at 7.
286. Reportedly, EPA stated in an October 31, 1997, letter to Rep. Dan Burton,
chairman of the House Government Reform and Oversight Committee, that the agency
agreed with the GAO recommendations and would institute reforms designed to implement
them. See Susan Bruninga, Statutory Limits, Mandate for Consensus, Among Barriers to
Reinvention, Panel Told, 28 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1350, 1351 (1997); see also Susan Brun-
inga, supra note 221, at 2530 (reporting that Charles Fox, head of EPA's Office of Rein-
vention, told the House Commerce Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations on No-
vember 4, 1997, that EPA planned to adopt all of the GAO recommendations).
287. In explaining why the State of Michigan decided to leave the CSI negotiations,
Michigan Department of Environmental Quality Director Russel Harding reportedly told
the House Commerce Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations on November 4,
1997, that "too many stakeholders have too much invested in the status quo to agree to any
real change." Susan Bruninga, supra note 221, at 2530.
Accordingly, the chief factor likely to be motivating industry's par-
ticipation in the CSI negotiations is the opportunity to push for regula-
tory alternatives that are less expensive (to industry) than the status
quo.288 Industry's interest, then, is likely to be in streamlining or elimi-
nating current regulation, and not n extending the scope of regulation
into new areas. This is the experience described by Lois Epstein of the
Environmental Defense Fund, who is a member of the petroleum refining
work group. "[Epstein] said many in the group wanted to look at leaking
above-ground storage tanks, an area not regulated by EPA, but industry
would not agree to that. 'You need some sort of stick to get the petroleum
industry to talk,' she said." 28 9 Additionally, since the environmental rep-
resentatives should not be expected to agree to a cheaper alternative if it
does not also represent increased environmental benefit, progress may be
slow in coming, especially in those industry sectors where few easy and
obvious "win/win" (i.e., cheaper and cleaner) regulatory improvements
present themselves.
Thus, it should not be surprising that the petroleum and automobile
industries decided to abandon their participation in the Initiative. Effec-
tive participation in negotiations of this nature takes a considerable
commitment of resources. As noted by the American Petroleum Institute
in a letter to EPA explaining the withdrawal of its member companies
from the CSI negotiations, the companies "believe the refining industry's
resources and those of EPA and the states can be more productively di-
rected toward other approaches. " 2 9 As summarized more bluntly by Ep-
stein, "[t]hey pulled out because for them it is not the most effective way
of getting what they want."291
Another systemic problem one would expect to encounter in nego-
tiations of this nature stems from the participants' unequal access to rele-
vant data. If effective strategies to encourage pollution prevention are to
be crafted by consensus, reliable technical information, especially infor-
mation relating to the technological potential for pollution prevention, is
likely to be important. Much of the relevant data, of course, will be in the
hands of industry. Without a clear incentive to make the data available to
the other participants, industry is likely to pick and choose what it will
share, making meaningful negotiations all the more difficult. This report-
edly has been a major issue, for example, in the computer and electronics
work group. Companies reportedly have been reluctant to divulge infor-
mation because "they feared that regulators would use the data to extract
further concessions[,]" and because they believed that environmental
288. As noted by GAO, "[i]n carrying out the Initiative, 'cleaner' is seen as the
principal interest of the environmental representatives, and 'cheaper' is seen as the princi-
pal interest of the industry representatives." GAO REPORT, supra note 268, at 23-24.
289. LeClair, supra note 281, at 222A.
290. Id.
291. Id.
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groups would "use information divulged during CSI meetings to mount
lawsuits."292 This, in turn, contributed to a sense of mistrust among the
environmental group participants. 293
This is not to say that CSI is not likely to produce any meaningful
results of substance. There are cleaner/cheaper opportunities in a number
of industries that may be able to be realized without the "push" of addi-
tional regulatory pressure, and CSI can be expected to bring some of
these to light. The metal finishing work group, for example, began a suc-
cessful demonstration of a new technology for filtering chromium from
air releases that is expected to decrease chromium emissions while also
reducing costs by about ninety percent,294 and has announced agreement
on an emission reduction program that may well rely, in part, on pollu-
tion prevention strategies.295 In addition, the printing work group has
been developing an education and outreach project designed "to achieve
fundamental change ... [by] incorporat[ing] the philosophy of pollution
prevention into everyday work practices .... "296 In general, however, the
292. Mazurek, supra note 224, at 157.
293. See id.
294. See LeClair, supra note 281, at 223A.
295. Metal finishing is a prime example of an industry sector where creative nego-
tiation would be expected to encourage pollution prevention, as pollution prevention meth-
ods (such as a "closed loop" recycling process for metals) have already been well-
demonstrated within the industry. See, e.g., Michael Berube et al., Case Study: From Pol-
lution Control to Zero Discharge: How The Robbins Company Overcame the Obstacles,
POLLUTION PREVENTION REV., Spring 1992, 189 (discussing the installation of a closed-
loop metals recovery system at a metal finishing facility). Under the Metal Finishing Stra-
tegic Goals Program, which was announced by EPA and the metal finishing work group on
October 27, 1997, and has not yet been implemented, participating firms would commit to
individual reductions designed to achieve the following total reductions in emissions by
the entire industry sector by 2002: reduce volatile organic compound ("VOC") emissions
to the air from 8000 tons to 2200 tons; reduce VOC discharges to the water from 250 tons
to 70 tons; reduce copper discharges to the air from 60 tons to 36 tons; reduce copper dis-
charges to the water from 173 tons to 104 tons; and reduce hazardous sludge from 500,000
tons to 300,000 tons. See Susan Bruninga, Metal Finishers, EPA Agree on Strategy to Cut
Pollution, Costs, Conserve Energy, 28 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1295 (1997). EPA, in turn, would
make changes in reporting, permitting, and monitoring requirements that reportedly would
reduce the firms' environmental administrative costs by 50%. See id. Among other goals of
the program are a 50% reduction in water use, a 25% reduction in energy use, and a "98%
efficiency in use of metals on products." Id. This last goal suggests a commitment to
achieving reductions in metals emissions through improvements in the production process
itself, a keystone of pollution prevention. However, EPA reportedly also stated that, "in the
near term," the agency "will consider reforming [RCRA hazardous waste] regulations to
allow metal finishing facilities to recover their metal wastes onsite .... " Id. This suggests,
at least in the short term, more of a commitment to waste recycling than to true process
change. See also Susan Bruninga, January Goal Set for Compliance Plan on Metal-
Finishing Sector Reinvention, 28 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1668 (1998) (describing further details
of the metal finishing program).
296. GAO REPORT, supra note 268, at 45. See also id. at 38-39. The printing work
group reportedly reached agreement on May 29, 1998, on "elements of a possible pilot
program" known as the "Printers' Simplified Total Environmental Partnership (PrintSTEP)
pilot program .... " Angela Baggetta, Basis for Printer Pilot Program Devised; Two Out-
standing Issues to Be Resolved, 29 Env't Rep. (BNA) 324 (1998). The focus of the pro-
posed pilot program would be on providing regulatory flexibility to the printing industry
bulk of the CSI negotiations thus far reportedly have not focused on pol-
lution prevention strategies.297 If this does not change, the CSI experi-
ment will have fallen well below EPA's original goals.
VII. CONCLUSION
Negotiation should hardly be viewed as a panacea for the various
difficulties that typically confront the policy-maker. Used in the right
context, however, negotiation can be a useful tool in the establishment,
implementation, and enforcement of environmental and occupational
health and safety policy. Negotiation can facilitate a better understanding
of issues, concerns, facts, and positions among adversaries. It can also
promote the sharing of relevant information, and can provide an opportu-
nity for creative problem-solving. Whether negotiation will be better than
other, generally more adversarial, mechanisms as a means of fostering
improvedenvironmental, health, and safety outcomes, or of stimulating
meaningful technological change, will depend on the situation in which it
is used. In general, negotiation would appear to work best as a means of
securing these goals in situations in which the necessary regulatory sig-
nals for improvement and innovation are already in place.
This is one of the reasons that EPA's use of negotiated compliance,
as embodied in its SEP policy, has been as successful as it has been. To
the firm that is the target of the enforcement action, the "stakes" are
clear; so long as it believes it faces higher costs (in the form of a larger
fine and/or higher transaction costs and/or adverse publicity) if it does
not identify and execute a SEP that is acceptable to EPA, the firm has a
meaningful incentive to participate in good faith in the SEP process. Ad-
ditionally, because the agency has structured the program to allow maxi-
mum credit for pollution prevention projects, pollution prevention can
become the focus, and the goal, of the negotiations. The pollution pre-
vention results of the SEP program have been relatively modest-mostly
diffusion and, sometimes, incremental innovation-but this is in keeping
by reformulating regulations to place the emphasis on multi-media performance. See id.
However, there reportedly is dissatisfaction within the printing work group, especially
among environmental justice representatives, regarding aspects of the program, see id. at
325, and it is not clear when, or if, the program will become fully defined and functional.
Moreover, although an emphasis on multi-media evaluation could lend itself to a con-
comitant emphasis on pollution prevention, it is not clear that a pollution prevention focus
will emerge.
297. As described by one source, "most of CSI's six sectors have proposed pilot
projects that represent incremental improvements possible under the extant regulatory
system. These projects are largely designed to reduce paperwork requirements, to improve
permitting, and to promote waste reduction through recycling and reuse efforts, rather than
pollution prevention." MAZUREK, supra note 224, at 155. See also GAO REPORT, supra
note 268, at 43-45 (noting only that only three of the fifteen projects chosen for study by
GAO appear to have a clear pollution prevention focus).
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with the relatively modest nature of the financial incentives typically in-
volved, and with the relatively short time period within which the SEP
typically must be identified and completed. Especially because negotia-
tion is the traditional means of resolving enforcement disputes, even out-
side of the SEP process, negotiation appears to work well here. OSHA
would be well-advised to design a policy of its own to take advantage of
the opportunities for positive technological changes that arise in appro-
priate enforcement situations.
One would also expect negotiation to work well in those negotiated
implementation situations that have a clear, formal focus on technologi-
cal change, such as the innovation waiver opportunities created by certain
environmental statutes and the "experimental" variance authorized by the
OSHAct. The chief signal to innovate-the new regulatory standard-is
already in place (or clearly on the horizon) before negotiation over the
waiver or variance begins, and the statutes typically provide an extended
period of time for the firm to develop and test the proposed innovation.
Thus, so long as the new standard is stringent enough to command the
firm's attention, firms should have a meaningful incentive to negotiate
time to pursue an innovative compliance alternative.
The fact that EPA's innovation waiver program has thus far not lived
up to expectations appears largely due to a failure of administration.
This, in turn, may have contributed to what appears to be an unwilling-
ness by Congress to include innovation waiver provisions in its revisions
to existing statutes. If EPA could develop and promote its innovation
waiver program the way it has the SEP program, the innovation waiver
might become a much more important means of securing environmen-
tally beneficial technological change. Similarly, although OSHA has not
made significant use of its experimental variance authority in the past,
there is good reason to believe that this provision could be a force for
technological change. OSHA should develop a set of criteria to help
define those situations in which a variance of this nature could be used
productively, and should publicize the availability of this option when it
promulgates a standard. The agency should then work with employers
and unions to help them identify opportunities for innovative technologi-
cal responses.
In contrast to negotiated compliance and negotiated implementation,
negotiated rulemaking is a situation in which the chief regulatory signal
for improvement and innovation is not already established, at least not in
full. Rather, one of the functions of negotiation in this context is to es-
tablish, either in part or in full, the stringency of the regulatory standard.
If the goal is innovation, this may well be problematic. If the nature of
the regulated industry is such that it will require a dramatic impetus, such
as the promulgation of an unexpectedly stringent standard (or the fear
that such a standard will be promulgated) before it will be motivated to
innovate, negotiated rulemaking may well be inadvisable. Since negoti-
ated rulemaking seeks consensus among the participants, and since such
an industry is unlikely to agree to a standard that it views as having a
"dramatic" impact, negotiated rulemaking is unlikely to produce a stan-
dard of this nature. In such situations, negotiated rulemaking's focus on
consensus can effectively remove the potential to spur innovation. 298
In situations in which the desired technological change is likely to
come more easily, negotiated rulemaking should be expected to have a
better chance of success. Here, the advantages of negotiation, such as
information-sharing and creative problem-solving, may work to encour-
age productive technological change. The key to the willingness of in-
dustry representatives to explore the technological options in good faith
is likely to be tied to what they perceive the likely "default" standard to
be. If they believe that, in the absence of a negotiated rule, the agency
will promulgate a stringent rule on its own, their willingness to focus on
creative technological solutions is likely to be higher. The agency can
facilitate this process by making clear at the outset that promoting tech-
nological change will be a focus of the regulation. If technologically lit-
erate stakeholders, such as certain trade unions or sophisticated nonprofit
groups, are involved, the dominance of industry's technical expertise
may be minimized, and outcomes that advance the state of the technol-
ogy may emerge.
Another important difference between negotiated rulemaking and
negotiations over SEPs and innovation waivers, however, is that the scope
of the negotiations in negotiated rulemaking is (at least) industry-wide,
rather than firm-specific. Interest in the negotiations thus is much
stronger, and the number of participants who must be involved, if the
negotiations are to succeed, is an order of magnitude higher. Accord-
ingly, management of the negotiation process becomes a formidable task,
and the agency must have the resources to be able to keep pace. There is
always the risk that the process itself, and not the ultimate results of the
process, will assume center stage, and that a focus on technological
change will give way to a focus on achieving consensus.
Many of these same concerns will be at hand when negotiation is
used in an extra-statutory sense, as it is now being used in EPA's Project
XL and Common Sense Initiative, in an attempt to change regulatory
policy. If the focus is industry-wide, as it is with CSI (and is often per-
ceived to be with Project XL), the resource demands will be large. Fur-
ther, where there is no meaningful incentive for industry negotiators to
move away from the status quo-that is, where there is no impending
"default" standard or requirement that they perceive as onerous-they
298. For an international study that makes this point, see ANDREW GOULDSON & JO-
SEPH MURPHY, REGULATORY REALITIES: THE IMPLEMENTATION AND IMPACT OF INDUS-
TRIAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION (1998) (comparing the technology-forcing success of
two regulatory systems, one of which-that of the United Kingdom-tends to rely on a
consensus-based approach, and the other of which-that of the Netherlands-does not).
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may well be interested only in those regulatory changes that save them
money.
In the last analysis, it must be recognized that negotiation is a proc-
ess that facilitates market solutions to questions regarding the appropriate
ends or means of compliance. That is, the relative bargaining power of
the stakeholders largely determines the outcome, unless it is checked at
the end of the process by a government agency with a strong sense of
trusteeship for the congressional policy it is charged with implementing.
Agencies who see themselves as mediators of the negotiation, or who
otherwise relinquish their statutory role as trustees, help to promote a
market-like result through the operation of the consensus process. For
example, when OSHA abdicates its policy-making responsibility by
making clear to industry and labor that it will accept a negotiated settle-
ment as the basis for occupational safety and health standards, the
chances that negotiation will produce meaningful safety and health gains
are reduced considerably. When this happens, the relative success of the :
negotiations likely will depend on whether some other factor, such as a
court ruling or a scientific study, can produce the kind of incentives that
are likely to promote technological change. If a superior result is to be
achieved, it likely will require the participation of agencies with both the
means and the will to take a firm position in support of health, safety, and
the environment, and in support of the development of new technologies.
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